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Chapter 1
Introduction
”The Information Society is a society in which the creation, distribution and manip-
ulation of information is becoming a significant economic and cultural activity. The
knowledge economy is its economic counterpart whereby wealth is created through the
economic exploitation of knowledge.”1
Wikipedia, the free internet encyclopedia, which is by itself a product of our
Information Society, provides this definition. The existence of Wikipedia, a costless
product, created by individuals, and meanwhile a serious substitute to encyclopedias
like Britannica, is a good example how the Information Society is changing markets
and competition.
In this study we analyze how markets work in the Information Society. In par-
ticular we concentrate on three important markets: the software market, the broad-
casting market and ”technology markets” where intellectual property rights can be
traded.2 All these markets are characterized by modes of competition that are rather
unorthodox and beyond simple Cournot or Bertrand models. Therefore, extended
models are needed to gain insights about competition in the Information Society.
Before the onset of game theory, the existing price theory addressed effectively
only situations of perfect competition and pure monopoly. However, in most cases,
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information society
2”Technology markets consist of the intellectual property that is licensed (the ”licensed technology”)
and its close substitutes–that is, the technologies or goods that are close enough substitutes significantly
to constrain the exercise of market power with respect to the intellectual property that is licensed.” (FTC
(1995))
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
and in particular in the Information Society, markets are characterized by imper-
fect competition. As Karl-Göran Mäler said in his presentation speech for the Nobel
Prize 1994 that was awarded to John Forbes Nash, Reinhard Selten and John Charles
Harsanyi, ”Many economists and social scientists subsequently tried to analyze the
outcome in other specific forms of strategic interaction. However, prior to the birth
of game theory, there was no toolbox that gave scholars access to a general but
rigorous method of analyzing different forms of strategic interaction.” We open this
toolbox and use its concepts of non-cooperative and cooperative game theory to
analyze how markets work in the Information Society. In the following we introduce
the three different markets and point out our contribution to their understanding.
The software market is highly concentrated. In particular Microsoft has a very
strong position due to its operating system Windows. Nevertheless, individuals and
firms invest in the development of Open Source Software like Linux. Approximately
50 % of the development is done by commercial firms.3 Interestingly, Linux evolves
as the only serious alternative to Windows. From an industrial organization per-
spective, commercial investment in a non-excludable public good like Open Source
Software is on a first glance puzzling. A firm cannot directly profit from the en-
hanced public good because it cannot sell the improvement. However, firms are
able to sell more complementary proprietary products at a potential higher price
by improving the non-excludable public good. Obviously, such an incentive to in-
vest in Open Source Software is beyond the treatment of simple competition models.
In chapter 2 we set up a model to analyze a market environment where firms can
produce a private good and can invest in its complementary non-excludable public
good like Open Source Software. However, firms can only sell the private good. By
studying the incentive to invest in such a non-excludable public good, we ask (1)
how market entry and (2) how a government investment in the public good affects
the firms’ output levels and profits. Surprisingly, we find that cases exist where in-
cumbents benefit from market entry. Moreover, we show the counter-intuitive result
that a government investment in the public good can increase the private investment
in the public good. Hence, we provide conditions under which a crowding in instead
of a crowding out occurs.
The second market we address is the broadcasting market. This market is gain-
ing more and more importance in our Information Society. This is clearly evident
3International Institute of Infonomics (2002)
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from the data. In Germany, the average time people watch television has increased
from 144 minutes in 1988 to 211 minutes in 2005. Furthermore, expenditures for
television advertising have risen from 880 million Euro in 1988 to 8.1 billion Euro
in 2005.4
In this study we consider competition between free-to-air broadcasting channels.
Their business idea is to match potential consumers and advertisers. Hence, the
channels air their programs to attract viewers in order to sell the attention of these
viewers to the advertisers. Competition in such a two-sided market is quite different
from usual markets because platforms have to take into account the link between
the two markets. The existing literature on such two-sided markets only deals with
participation externalities: A change in a channel’s advertising level changes its own
and the competitors’ number of viewers. So far, the literature has neglected pe-
cuniary externalities between broadcasting channels. Pecuniary externalites change
the equilibrium advertising price on all channels if a channel changes its advertising
level. This externality plays an important role in the real world, and we show that
it changes the theoretical predictions of the existing models.
In Chapter 3 we build a model that includes both externalities. In our setup
differentiated platforms compete in advertising. They offer consumers a service free
of charge, such as a TV program, which is financed by advertising. We show that
advertising can exhibit the property of a strategic substitute or complement. This
is in contrast to the existing literature. Surprisingly, cases exist in which platforms
benefit from market entry. Moreover, we show that perfect competition is not always
desirable from a welfare point of view.
Knowledge and its protection is gaining more and more importance in the In-
formation Society. Often, firms rely on patents to protect their innovations. In the
US, the number of patents granted per year almost tripled from 70.000 to 190.000
between 1970 and 2004.5 Hence, patents and the outcomes of patent litigation play
an important role in many markets.
In this study we consider the mode of competition in technology markets where
patents are involved. For many years economists just assumed that issued patents
are valid for sure. Hence, in former models no uncertainty existed whether the
4Source: www.agf.de/daten
5Leonard and Stiroh (2005)
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patent is infringed by another party or not. Recently, research has focused on the
probabilistic nature of patents. As Shapiro (2003) states, patents give the paten-
tholder not the right to exclude a potential infringer, but the right to try to exclude
the potential infringer by a lawsuit. Empirically, roughly half of all lawsuits are lost
by the patentholder. This highlights the probabilistic nature of patents.6 In most
cases firms do not rely on a court decision to resolve a patent dispute, but settle
their conflict out of court. For example, Lanjouw and Schankerman (2002) find
that 95% of all patent lawsuits are settled prior to a court judgment. These patent
settlements often include licensing contracts between the firms. For the antitrust
authorities the design of such contracts is highly suspicious, particularly if the par-
ties are (potentially) horizontal competitors in the relevant market. Firms can easily
use these contracts to fix prices or to split up markets in order to soften competition
between them. Hence, antitrust limits to patent settlements are urgently needed.
In Chapter 4 we look at such antitrust limits to patent settlements given that
patents are probabilistic. So far, the literature addressed probabilistic patents only
in a static environment. In contrast, we allow for market entry. Hence, we con-
sider the impact of different antitrust limits to patent settlements on market entry
incentives. We show that unconstrained settlements are not preferable at all from
a welfare point of view. Furthermore, even constrained settlements, as proposed by
Shapiro (2003), can decrease social welfare and harm the patentholder. Surprisingly,
we find that a patentholder may prefer very restrictive antitrust limits.
6Estimations of the probability that the patentee wins the lawsuit are between 35% and 70%. See
Lanjouw and Schankerman (1998) for a survey of the corresponding empirical literature.
Chapter 2
Private Provision of a
Complementary Public Good
2.1 Introduction
An increasing number of firms, like IBM and Hewlett-Packard or Suse and Red
Hat, have begun to invest in Open Source Software. Open Source Software, such as
Linux, is typically under the General Public License. This license implies that the
software, including any improvement, has to be provided for free. Hence, an Open
Source Software can be seen as a non-excludable public good. Therefore, firms are
not able to sell the Open Source Software or their improvements. This raises the
question why companies invest in such a public good.
Lerner and Tirole (2000) argue that firms expect to benefit from some market
segment the demand of which is boosted by the improvement of a complementary
Open Source Software. Even though the companies cannot directly capture the
value of an open source program’s improvement, they can profit indirectly through
selling more complementary proprietary goods at a potentially higher price.
This incentive to invest in a non-excludable public good does not only arise in
the case of Open Source Software. For example, a similar argument could be made in
the case of advertising that increases the demand of the advertising firm and at the
same time the demand of its competitors. Friedman (1983) calls this ”cooperative
advertising”. Another example are lobby-activities of a firm that have a positive
5
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effect on the whole industry.
In this chapter we study the incentive of firms to invest in such a non-excludable
public good. In particular we address the following two questions:
(1) What is the effect of a higher public good investment by the government on
the firms’ output levels and profits?
(2) How does market entry affect the private incentive to invest in the public
good? Furthermore, how does market entry influence the incumbents’ profits?
We contribute to answer the questions (1) and (2) by analyzing a model with
Cournot competition. Firms can produce a private good, and they can invest in a
non-excludable public good in order to enhance its quality. However, they can only
sell the private good. The private good and the public good are complements for the
consumers. An increase in the quality of the public good increases their willingness
to pay for the private good.
The first question is particularly interesting because of the ongoing discussion
whether or not the government should support Open Source Software and if so,
how.1 A concern might be that higher government investment in the public good
decreases firms’ investments as it is known from the public good literature.2 Hence,
one usually expects a crowding out. Interestingly, such a crowding out does not
have to take place with a complementary public good. We show that it might occur
that the firms’ investments increase if the government increases its investment in the
public good. Hence, a crowding in can occur. Thus, it is not obvious whether the
government investment in the public good is a strategic substitute or complement
to the firms’ public good investment.
The second question is shortly addressed by Lerner and Tirole (2000). They
argue that the usual free-rider problem might appear because firms are not able to
capture all the benefits of their investments. Therefore, one might argue that the
free-rider problem gets worse with an increasing number of firms. Hence, a firm’s
investment in the public good decreases with market entry. As we will show in
our model, it might occur that the opposite happens and thus each firm invests
more. Furthermore, we show that market entry of an additional firm has a positive
1See e.g. Hahn (2002), Evans and Reddy (2003) or Schmidt and Schnitzer (2002).
2e.g Bergstrom et al. (1986)
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externality (through the entrant’s investment in the public good) and a negative ex-
ternality (through the entrant’s production of the private good) on the incumbents.
We find that for certain cost and demand functions each firm reduces its private
good production and its public good investment when market entry occurs. In this
case incumbents suffer a decrease in profits and dislike market entry. Surprisingly,
for certain cost and demand constellations it is also possible that every firm expands
its investment in the public good, combined with a higher private good output, when
market entry occurs. In this case market entry increases the incumbents’ profits.
However, a social planer unambiguously prefers market entry.
This chapter is related to the public good literature that is concerned with the
private provision of a non-excludable public good. In standard models of private pro-
vision of a public good, households can buy the private good, they can contribute
to the public good, and they face a budget constraint.3 A household receives utility
directly from the consumption of both goods and has to decide how to allocate his
budget between the two goods. This setup differs from our model. We consider
agents that have no direct benefit from the public good. The firms produce the
public good solely due to the complementarity. Furthermore, firms face no budget
constraint.
A second strand of literature our chapter is related to is the literature on Mul-
timarket Oligopoly. Bulow et al. (1985) analyze the spillovers of a change in one
market environment on the related markets. In contrast to their model, in our model
the markets are not related via the production technology, but via the demand func-
tion. Bulow et al. (1985) address this issue, but do not formalize it. They mention
that firms have to take care of cross-effects in making marginal revenue calculations.
Moreover, firms have to consider the strategic effects of their actions in one market
on the competitors’ actions in a second market. In our model we extend this setup
to the case of a non-excludable public good. This is in contrast to the model of
Bulow et al. (1985) where only private goods are considered.
Becker and Murphy (1993) analyze a model in which advertisement and an ad-
vertised good enter the utility function of the households. Advertisement has the
property that it rises the willingness to pay for the advertised good. Hence, it is
complementary to the advertised good from an economic point of view. Neverthe-
3See e.g. Bergstrom et al. (1986) for a general approach and e.g Bitzer and Schröder (2002) or Johnson
(2002) for an application to Open Source Software.
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less, a firm’s advertisement is only complementary to its own private good in their
setup. By contrast, in our model it is also complementary to their competitors’
private good.
Friedman (1983) considers, as a special case, cooperative advertising in a dy-
namic setup. He models advertising like capital in such a way that a firm can use
advertising to build up a ”goodwill stock”. The firms have to decide how much to
spend on advertising and how to allocate these spendings over time. By using ”a
symmetric quadratic model”, he shows that an increasing number of active firms
leads to a steady-state in which conventional competitive effects dominate. Hence,
prices converge to marginal costs. In contrast, we look at a static game to concen-
trate explicitly on the externalities between the firms. As we will see, this leads to
different results.
We will proceed as follows. In the next section we set up the model. In Section
3 we look at the properties of the market equilibrium. In Section 4 we analyze
the consequences of a government investment in the public good. In Section 5 we
consider the effects of market entry. The final section concludes.
2.2 The Model
We assume that firms are engaged in a one-period Cournot competition. They
decide simultaneously about their private good production and their investment in
the public good, taking as given the competitors’ production and investment. We
denote by xi (xi ∈ [0;xi]) the firm i’s (i ∈ {1, ..., N}) production of the homogenous
private good. By yi (yi ∈ [0; yi]) we denote the firm i’s investment in the homogenous
non-excludable public good. Such an investment increases the quality of the public
good linearly Y =
∑N
i=1 yi.
4 The private good and the public good are complements
for the consumers. Their willingness to pay for the private good is increasing in
the quality of the public good and hence in the firms’ public good investments. For
an illustration consider a computer server (=the private good) and an Open Source
Software (=the public good). The performance of the server depends crucially on
the ability of the server operating system to use the power of the hardware. If the
quality of the operating system increases, then the consumers’ willingness to pay for
4Throughout this chapter we speak about quality of the public good. In some cases, like advertising,
one can interpret this quality as a measure of quantity.
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the server increases due to the better performance. This yields the following private
good demand function
p = p(xi, yi, X−i, Y−i), (2.1)
∂p
∂xi
< 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, (2.2)
∂p
∂yi
> 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. (2.3)
We denote by X−i =
∑N
j=1;j 6=i xj the other firms’ production of the private good.
By Y−i =
∑N
j=1;j 6=i yj we denote the other firms’ investment in the public good.
Furthermore, we have the following revenue function of firm i
Ri(xi, yi, X−i, Y−i) = xip(xi, yi, X−i, Y−i) (2.4)
and the following profit function
πi = Ri(xi, yi, X−i, Y−i)−Kx(xi)−Kyi (yi). (2.5)
We denote by Kx(xi) the private good cost function. For simplicity, we assume
that this cost function is the same for all firms. We assume that firm i has to incur
the costs Kyi (yi) for investing yi in the public good. Hence, we call this function
”public good cost function”. Furthermore, we assume that the public good cost
function can be different for different firms.
In order to have a well defined maximization problem, we assume that the profit
function πi is continuous and strictly concave in xi and yi. The following conditions,
satisfied for all (xi, yi), yield a Hessian matrix that is everywhere negative definite.
This a sufficient condition for a strictly concave profit function
Condition 1:
∂2πi
∂x2i
< 0; (2.6)
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Condition 2:
∂2πi
∂y2i
< 0; (2.7)
Condition 3:
∂2πi
∂x2i
∂2πi
∂y2i
> [
∂2πi
∂xi∂yi
]2. (2.8)
In order to satisfy Condition 1, we assume that the private good cost function
is convex ∂
2Kx(xi)
∂x2i
≥ 0 and that the revenue function is strictly concave ∂2Ri
∂x2i
< 0.
For example, a concave demand function ∂
2p
∂x2i
≤ 0 is sufficient for a strictly concave
revenue function.
In order to satisfy Condition 2, we assume a concave revenue function and a
convex public good cost function, with at least one strict, because subtracting a
convex (strictly convex) function from a strictly concave (concave) function yields a
strictly concave function.
∂2R
∂y2
≤ 0 and ∂
2Kyi (yi)
∂y2i
≥ 0, at least one strict. (2.9)
For example, a concave demand function ∂
2p
∂y2i
≤ 0 yields a strictly concave profit
function if the public good cost function is strictly convex.
In order to satisfy Condition 3, we have to assume that
[
∂2Ri
∂x2i
− ∂
2Kx
∂x2i
][
∂2Ri
∂y2i
− ∂
2Kyi
∂y2i
] > [
∂2Ri
∂xi∂yi
]2, (2.10)
⇔ [2 ∂p
∂xi
+ xi
∂2p
∂x2i
− ∂
2Kx
∂x2i
][xi
∂2p
∂y2i
− ∂
2Kyi
∂y2i
] > [xi
∂2p
∂xi∂yi
+
∂p
∂yi
]2 . (2.11)
The stationary point does not have to be a maximum without this technical
assumption.
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2.3 Market Equilibrium
In this section we solve the game and determine the three different kinds of market
equilibria. We show that a unique equilibrium can exist if the marginal costs of the
public good are increasing. In contrast, a multiplicity of equilibria may arise if the
marginal costs of the public good are constant.
We start with the case of increasing marginal costs of the public good.
Proposition 2.1 Suppose that the public good’s marginal costs are increasing. There
exists a unique Nash Equilibrium where the firms produce x∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2, ..., x
∗
N ) of the
private good and invest y∗ = (y∗1, y
∗
2, ..., y
∗
N ) in the public good if
(N − 1)|xi ∂
2p
∂xi∂xj
+
∂p
∂xj
|+N |xi ∂
2p
∂xi∂yj
+
∂p
∂yj
|+( ∂
2p
∂xi∂xi
xi +2
∂p
∂xi
) <
∂2Kx(xi)
∂xi∂xi
, ∀i
(2.12)
and
(N − 1)|xi ∂
2p
∂yi∂xj
|+ |xi ∂
2p
∂yi∂xi
+
∂p
∂xi
|+ (2−N)xi ∂
2p
∂yi∂yj
<
∂2Kyi (yi)
∂yi∂yi
, ∀i (2.13)
Proof. See Appendix.
In order to see the intuition behind Proposition 2.1, we write down firm i’s profit
function
πi = xip (xi, X−i, yi, Y−i)−Kx(xi)−Kyi (yi). (2.14)
Profit maximization yields the following first order conditions
∂πi
∂xi
= p + xi
∂p
∂xi
− ∂K
x(xi)
∂xi
= 0, (2.15)
∂πi
∂yi
= xi
∂p
∂yi
− ∂K
y
i (yi)
∂yi
= 0. (2.16)
Equation (2.15) displays the standard optimality condition. It says that the
marginal costs of the private good have to be equal to the marginal revenue of the
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private good. Equation (2.16) shows that the investment in the public good has
only an indirect effect on the profit. If the public good’s quality increases, then the
consumers’ willingness to pay increases. This rises the price of the private good.
Therefore, the revenue of firm i increases.
Proposition 2.1 states that there is a unique Nash Equilibrium x∗ and y∗. From
the Equations (2.15) and (2.16) we see that the production of the private good can
reinforce the incentive to invest in the public good and vice versa. In order to il-
lustrate this, consider an increase in the private good production of firm i. This
increases the incentive to invest in the public good. A higher public good invest-
ment increases the price of the private good. Compared to the situation with a
lower private good production, this price increase works on more private good units.
Hence, for a firm it gets more attractive to invest in the public good if its private
good production increases.5
At the same time, a higher public good investment also increases the incentives
to produce the private good. The public good investment leads to a higher price of
the private good because it increases the consumers’ willingness to pay. Therefore,
selling an additional unit gets more attractive because a firm earns a higher price
out of the additional unit sold.6 But once again, this higher output level can yield a
higher incentive to invest in the public good. Hence, the incentives to produce the
private good and to invest in the public good can reinforce each other.
Conditions 1-3 ensure that this described process converges to a unique maxi-
mum for each firm if one takes the production and investment of the other firms
as given. In order to determine the Nash-Equilibrium, we additionally have to take
into account that the investment of a firm in the public good increases the incentive
to produce the private good for all other firms. This may increase the other firms’
incentive to invest in the public good and so on.
The two technical assumptions of Proposition 2.1 guarantee a unique Nash-
Equilibrium (x∗, y∗) by ensuring a contraction mapping of the best response func-
tions. Hence, the equilibrium (x∗, y∗) is globally stable and therefore unique.
5Of course, this is only true if the effect of the cross derivative ∂
2p
∂xi∂yi
does not work in the opposite
direction and dominates.
6Of course, as above, this is only true if the effect from the cross derivative ∂
2p
∂xi∂yi
does not work in the
opposite direction and dominates.
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In the two next propositions we consider constant marginal costs of the public
good. We show that a multiplicity of equilibria or an asymmetric equilibrium arises.
Proposition 2.2 Suppose that the public good’s marginal costs are constant and
equal for all firms. There are an infinite number of equilibria. In all equilibria x∗i is
the same and the firms’ investment in the public good always sums up to a certain
level Y ∗ if the following condition is fulfilled
(N − 1)|xi ∂
2p
∂xi∂xj
+
∂p
∂xj
|+ N |xi ∂
2p
∂xi∂yj
+
∂p
∂yj
|+ ( ∂
2p
∂xi∂xi
xi + 2
∂p
∂xi
) <
∂2Kx(xi)
∂xi∂xi
.
(2.17)
Proof. See Appendix.
In contrast to Proposition 2.1, Proposition 2.2 states that all public good invest-
ment vectors y = (y1, ..., yN ) that sum up to Y ∗ =
∑N
i=1 yi are Nash-Equilibria. In
the previous case the individual investment level y∗i was determined by the increas-
ing marginal costs. If these are constant, then a coordination problem between the
firms occurs. For an illustration suppose two firms that produce the same quantities
of the private good. Suppose that firm 1 assumes that firm 2 invests nothing in
the public good. Then firm 1 should invest until its marginal revenue of the public
good is equal to its marginal costs. Given this investment of firm 1, firm 2 should
invest nothing because its marginal revenue and its marginal costs are the same as
for firm 1. Generally, if firm 1 is in an optimum given to the investment of firm 2,
then firm 2 is also in an optimum given to the investment of firm 1. This fact yields
the infinite number of possible equilibria.7
In the next proposition we show the properties of an asymmetric equilibrium.
For simplicity, we only address the case of two firms {i,−i}. A generalization to N
firms is straightforward.
Proposition 2.3 Suppose that firm i’s constant marginal costs for investing in the
public good are lower than the constant marginal costs of firm −i
∂Kyi
∂yi
<
∂Ky−i
∂y−i
. (2.18)
7The technical assumption in Proposition 2.2 ensures that the best response functions with respect to
the private good are a contraction mapping.
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In the unique Nash Equilibrium both firms produce the same quantity of the
private good (x∗i = x
∗
−i) and only firm i invests in the public good (y
∗
i = Y
∗; y∗−i = 0)
if the following condition is fulfilled
(N − 1)|xi ∂
2p
∂xi∂xj
+
∂p
∂xj
|+ N |xi ∂
2p
∂xi∂yj
+
∂p
∂yj
|+ ( ∂
2p
∂xi∂xi
xi + 2
∂p
∂xi
) <
∂2Kx(xi)
∂xi∂xi
(2.19)
Proof. See Appendix.
In the following we first check whether the described equilibrium is indeed an
equilibrium. Afterwards, we show that this equilibrium is unique.
Suppose that the firms choose (x∗i = x
∗
−i, y
∗
i = Y
∗, y∗−i = 0). With respect to
the private good we know that the marginal costs of i and −i are equal at the point
x∗i = x
∗
−i. What can we say about the marginal revenues? With respect to the
marginal revenue of the private good we know that it does not matter whether firm
i or −i invests in the public good. Only the resulting quality of the public good
Y = yi + y−i is important. Therefore, the marginal revenue with respect to the pri-
vate good is the same for both firms. Thus, both firms produce the same quantity
of the private good.
Furthermore, suppose that firm i’s optimal response to y∗−i = 0 is y
∗
i = Y
∗ given
x∗i = x
∗
−i. This an equilibrium if firm −i has no incentive to deviate from y∗−i = 0.
We know that the optimal response of firm i implies that
xi
∂p
∂yi
|x∗i =x∗−i,yi=Y ∗i y∗−i=0=
∂Kyi
∂yi
. (2.20)
Furthermore, we know that the marginal revenue with respect to the public good
is the same for both firms with x∗i = x
∗
−i. Hence, if firm −i has higher constant
marginal costs than firm i, then it directly follows that
x−i
∂p
∂y−i
|x∗i =x∗−i,yi=Y ∗i y∗−i=0<
∂Ky−i
∂y−i
. (2.21)
Therefore, it is indeed optimal for firm −i to choose y−i = 0. Hence, x∗i =
x∗−i, yi = Y
∗, y−i = 0 is an equilibrium.
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Uniqueness follows from the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies.8
Assume that firm i invests nothing (yi = 0) and denote the best response of firm
−i as ỹ−i |yi=0. This is the maximal value of y−i that makes sense for firm −i
because if yi > 0, then it follows ỹ−i |yi>0< ỹ−i |yi=0. Hence, all y−i > ỹ−i |yi=0 are
strictly dominated by ya−i = ỹ−i |yi=0. Given this, the smallest yi that firm i should
choose is ỹi |ya−i . This is the best response to ya−i. Hence, all yi < ỹi |ya−i are strictly
dominated by yai = ỹi |ya−i . Given this, firm −i should maximal invest ỹ−i |yai < ya−i.
Hence, all y−i > ỹ−i |yai are strictly dominated by ỹ−i |yai = yb−i. It is obvious that
this process converges to the unique equilibrium where yi = Y ∗ and y−i = 0.
2.4 Government Intervention
Let us now consider the effects of government intervention. Assume that the gov-
ernment starts to invest or changes its investment in the public good. This is not a
hypothetical assumption as one can see from the direct US Government support for
Linux. For example, the US government decided to finance a research project at a
university to improve Linux (Evans and Reddy (2003)). In the following we assume
that the government can invest directly in the public good as the firms. By yG we
denote the investment of the government in the public good.
If the government increases its investment in the public good, one usually ex-
pects a crowding out in such a way that the firms decrease their investment in the
public good. At least, this is what the standard public good literature states in the
context of households.9 In these models households have a certain budget. They
have to decide how to allocate their budget between a private and a public good.
In an interior equilibrium each household splits up his budget in such a way that
his marginal utility of the private good is equal to his marginal utility of the public
good. Suppose that the government increases its public good investment. Usually
this decreases the marginal utility of the public good. Therefore, households shift
money from the investment in the public good to the consumption of the private
good in such a way that the marginal utilities are again equal. Thus, a crowding
out occurs.
In this section we show that such a crowding out does not have to occur in
8Uniqueness of x∗i = x
∗
−i follows from the technical condition in the Proposition 2.3. This yields that
the best response functions with respect to the private good are a contracting mapping.
9see e.g. Bergstrom et.al. (1985)
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our setup. Instead, a crowding in is possible.10 Thus, a higher government invest-
ment in the public good can yield a higher investment of the firms in the public good.
In order to understand how the government investment influences the incentive
of a firm to invest in the public good, we have to distinguish between direct and
indirect effects. Therefore, we take the total derivative of the first order conditions:
Total derivative of ∂πi∂xi
[2 ∗ ∂p
∂xi
+ xi
∂2p
∂x2i
− ∂
2K(xi)
∂x2i
]dxi+
indirect effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
[
∂p
∂yi
+ xi
∂2p
∂xi∂yi
]dyi
direct effects︷ ︸︸ ︷
+[
∂p
∂X−i
+ xi
∂2p
∂xi∂X−i
]dX−i + [
∂p
∂Y−i
+ xi
∂2p
∂xi∂Y−i
]dY−i= 0. (2.22)
Total derivative of ∂πi∂yi
indirect effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
[
∂p
∂yi
+ xi
∂2p
∂xi∂yi
]dxi +[xi
∂2p
∂y2i
− ∂
2Ki(yi)
∂y2i
]dyi
direct effects︷ ︸︸ ︷
+[xi
∂2p
∂yi∂X−i
]dX−i + [xi
∂2p
∂yi∂Y−i
]dY−i= 0, (2.23)
with
dX−i =
N∑
j=1,i6=j
dxj and dY−i =
N∑
j=1,i6=j
dyj + dyG. (2.24)
Equation (2.22) and (2.23) illustrate the decomposition into direct and indirect
effects.
1. The direct effect influences xi (yi) by a change in X−i and Y−i without depending
on a change in the corresponding complement yi (xi).
10Because one can consider several different cases, we restrict our attention to only two examples which
highlight the possible outcomes.
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2. The indirect effect influences the optimal level of xi (yi) by a change in the cor-
responding complement yi (xi).
For an illustration, suppose that IBM, a producer of hardware like computer
servers, faces an exogenous increase in the quality of the complementary public good
Linux. For example, IBM learns that the government finances a research project
at a university in order to improve Linux. We denote this by dyG > 0. How does
this exogenous shock influences IBM’s incentives to produce the private good and
to invest in the public good? On the one hand, the government investment in the
public good increases the consumers’ valuation of IBM’s hardware. This gives IBM
an incentive to increase its production of the hardware (= a direct effect of dY−i on
dxi). On the other hand, the additional public good investment may decrease IBM’s
incentive to invest in the public good because keeping the old investment level leads
to an inefficient high quality of the public good from IBM’s point of view (= a direct
effect of dY−i on dyi). Furthermore, indirect effects appear. If IBM produces more
servers, this changes its incentive to invest in the public good Linux (=indirect effect
of dxi on dyi). Additionally, if IBM changes its investment in Linux, the quality of
Linux changes. This has an effect on IBM’s incentive to produce the private good
(= indirect effect of dyi on dxi).
As we show in the following proposition, these direct and indirect effects can
yield a crowding in.
Proposition 2.4 Suppose that the government increases its public good investment
dyG > 0. Each firm increases its private good production and its public good invest-
ment if
• the marginal revenue of the public good is constant (∂2p
∂y2i
= 0);
• the marginal production costs of the public good are increasing (∂2K
y
i
∂y2i
> 0);
• the cross derivative of the price is non-negative ( ∂2p∂yi∂xi ≥ 0).
Proof. See Appendix.
The firms are in an equilibrium before the government changes its investment.
In this equilibrium the marginal costs of the public good are equal to the marginal
revenue of the public good. If the government increases its investment in the public
CHAPTER 2. COMPLEMENTARY PUBLIC GOOD 18
good, then the marginal revenue with respect to the public good does not change
(∂
2p
∂y2i
= 0). Therefore, the firms have no direct incentive to adjust their investment
in the public good. Nevertheless, if the quality of the public good increases, then
the firms have an incentive to increase their production of the private good (=direct
effect) because the private good’s price increases. This higher private good output
has a feedback-effect (= indirect effect) on the incentives to invest in the public
good. A firm’s marginal revenue of the public good increases if the firm produces
more of the private good. Finally, the investment of the government yields a higher
public good investment of the firms. Hence, no crowding out, but a crowding in
occurs. Furthermore, the total supply of the private good increases.
As a second case we consider the opposite to a crowding in. We show that a total
crowding out might occur. Hence, firms reduce their investment in the public good
in such a way that the quality of the public good remains constant. In addition, this
yields no change in the private good production.
Proposition 2.5 Suppose that the government increases its public good investment
dyG. Each firm does not change its private good production and the public good
investment of the firms gets adjusted in such a way that a total crowding out occurs∑N
i=1 dyi = −dyG if
• the marginal revenue of the public good is decreasing (∂2p
∂y2i
< 0);
• the marginal production costs of the public good are constant (∂2K
y
i
∂y2i
= 0) and
• the change in the government investment is not higher then the total invest-
ment of the firms
∑N
i=1 y
∗
i > dyG.
Proof. From Proposition 2.2 and 2.3 we know that the investment in the public
good has always to sum up to Y ∗ with constant marginal costs. The last condition
ensures that the firms’ new optimal investment level remains non-negative.
Given constant marginal costs and a decreasing marginal revenue of the public
good, there exists an intersection where marginal revenue is equal to marginal costs.
This point determines the individually optimal investment level in the public good.
If the government increases its investment in the public good, then the marginal
costs are higher than the marginal revenue because the marginal revenue decreases.
Therefore, the firms have an incentive to decrease their investment in the public
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good. They should decrease their investment until the marginal costs are again
equal to marginal revenue. This is achieved by a total crowding out. Finally, the
quality of the public good does not change. This leads to no adjustment of the private
good production. From a welfare point of view, the consumers do not benefit from
the government intervention. Only the firms are better off. They invest less in the
public good. Nevertheless, they get the same price for their proprietary product as
before. In this case the investment of the government only increases the profits of the
firms. The government investment has neither an impact on the firms’ production
of the private good nor on the quality of the public good.
2.5 Market Entry
Let us now turn to the effects of market entry. In the last section we have assumed
that the firms face a given exogenous shock with respect to the quality of the public
good. Given market entry, the dimension of this shock is determined endogenously.
Furthermore, market entry changes the total supply of the private good. Therefore,
we use a linear-quadratic framework to solve this game analytically. Hence, we use
the following inverse demand function
p = A− bX + cY. (2.25)
In this function b and c represent weight factors. They determine the impact of
the private good and the impact of the public good on the market price. One can
easily derive such a demand function from the following maximization problem of a
representative consumer
max
x,z
U = (A + cy)x− 1
2
bx2 + z s.t. z + xp = m . (2.26)
Furthermore, we consider N identical firms that have the same quadratic cost
functions
Kx(xi) = dx2i , (2.27)
Ky(yi) = fy2i . (2.28)
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The parameters d and f represent the weight of the cost functions in the profit
function.
In the following we introduce Lemma 2.1 to ensure an interior solution of this
game.
Lemma 2.1 There exists a unique Nash Equilibrium (x∗, y∗) where each firm chooses
the same x∗i and y
∗
i if the following conditions are fulfilled:
Case 1: If f ≥ c22b , then it has to be true that N <
3b+2d− c2
f
b− c2
2f
.
Case 2: If f < c
2
2b , then it has to be true that N <
b+2d
−b+ 1
2f
.
Proof. See Appendix.
The conditions in Lemma 2.1 are always easily to fulfill because one can find
a sufficiently high d for each value of N . Intuitively, Lemma 2.1 ensures that the
firms’ best reply functions are a contraction mapping. This is the case if the costs
of the private good have enough weight, so d is high enough.
To find the optimal values (x∗i ; y
∗
i ), we write down the profit function of a firm
i. We denote by xj and yj the production of firm j ∈ {1, ..., N} \ i
πi = xi(A− bxi − (N − 1)bxj + cyi + (N − 1)cyj)− dx2i − fy2i . (2.29)
The first-order conditions are
∂πi
∂xi
= A− 2bxi − (N − 1)bxj + cyi + (N − 1)cyj − 2dxi = 0, (2.30)
∂πi
∂yi
= cxi − 2fyi = 0. (2.31)
Solving (2.31) for y∗i yields
y∗i =
c
2f
xi. (2.32)
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Equation (2.32) shows that y∗i depends on the firm’s own production of the
private good, on the weight of the public good cost function f , and on the impact
of the public good on the price. Therefore, the optimal level of y∗i is independent of
the production of the other firms and changes only if x∗i changes. This follows from
the fact that the cross derivative of the price is zero. We summarize this observation
in Lemma 2.2.
Lemma 2.2 A firm i’s optimal public good investment y∗i depends only on its pri-
vate good production
y∗i =
c
2f
xi.
Intuitively, a firm’s public good investment increases the private good’s price.
The effect of yi on p is constant and equal to c. Therefore, the marginal revenue of
yi is cxi. The marginal costs are 2fyi. The marginal revenue has to be equal to the
marginal costs in the optimum. We see that the relationship between xi and yi is
linear and the constant slope depends on the weight of the public good’s production
cost f and on the impact of yi on p.
In a next step we determine firm i’s optimal private good supply. Solving (2.30)
for x∗i and using (2.32) and symmetry yields the optimal private good production of
firm i.
x∗i =
A
b(1 + N)− c22f N + 2d
. (2.33)
After deriving the firms’ optimal production and investment levels, we consider
how these change due to market entry. Suppose that an additional firm enters the
market that has access to the same technology as the incumbents. Hence, it can
invest in the public good and it can produce the private good. The new firm’s
production of the private good and its investment in the public good leads to two
effects. On the one hand, the price decreases because competition in the private
good market gets tougher. This decreases the incentives to produce xi. On the
other hand, the entrant’s investment in the public good increases the consumers’
valuation of the private good. This yields an incentive to increase the production
of the private good. Hence, it is not obvious whether an incumbent increases or
decreases its production of the private good.
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Proposition 2.6 Suppose that the number of competing firms increases.
• If the weight of the public good’s production costs is relatively high (f > c22b),
then each incumbent reduces its production x∗i and investment y
∗
i .
• If the weight of the public good’s production costs is relatively low (f < c22b),
then each incumbent increases its production x∗i and investment y
∗
i .
If f = c
2
2b , then each incumbent does not change its production x
∗
i and investment
y∗i .
Proof.
To prove Proposition 2.6 we take the first derivative of x∗i with respect to N .
∂x∗i
∂N
= − A(
b (1 + N)− 12 c
2
f N + 2d
)2
(
b− 1
2
c2
f
)
We see that ∂x
∗
i
∂N is negative if f >
c2
2b , is zero if
c2
2b , and is positive if f <
c2
2b . Fur-
thermore, from Lemma 2.2 follows that y∗i changes in the same direction as x
∗
i .
If the weight of the public good cost function is small (f < c
2
2b) then, in equilib-
rium, the entrant invests so much in the public good that it makes up for its negative
pecuniary externality. This leads to an increase in the price. The increase in the
price yields a higher incentive to produce the private good. It directly follows that
the firms increase their public good investment, too (Lemma 2.2). If the weight of
the public good cost function is high (f > c
2
2b), then the opposite is true.
Let us now consider the total supply of the private good X∗ and the quality of
the public good Y ∗. By taking the derivative with respect to N , we see that X∗ and
Y ∗ are increasing in N .
∂X∗
∂N
=
A ∗ [b + 2d]
[b(1 + N)− 12 c
2
f N + 2d]
2
> 0 (2.34)
⇒ ∂Y
∗
∂N
> 0 (Lemma 2.2) (2.35)
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We see that the entrant’s production is always high enough to make up for a
possible decline in the incumbents’ production and investment. Hence, if the number
of firms increases, then the total production of the private good and the quality of
the public good increases. However, even if the total supply of the private good
always increases in N , the market price does not have to decrease. Hence, counter-
intuitively, market entry can increase the price of the private good.
Proposition 2.7 Suppose that the number of competing firms increases.
• If the weight of the public good’s production costs is relatively high (f > c22b),
then the price p decreases.
• If the weight of the public good’s production costs is relatively low (f < c22b),
then the price p increases.
If f = c
2
2b , then the price does not change.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, we know that an increase in the private good production decreases
the price and that a higher investment level in the public good increases the price.
Hence, it depends on the dimension of the two effects whether the price increases or
decreases. If the weight of the public good cost function is relatively low, then the
firms invest so much in the public good that the price increases. If weight of the
public good cost function is relatively high, then the opposite is true.
Let us now consider the firms’ profits. We know that in a ”normal” Cournot-
Game, i.e. without a public good, incumbents dislike market entry because the
entrant has a negative pecuniary externality. In contrast, in our setup the entrant
has also a positive pecuniary externality by investing in the public good. Hence, it
is not obvious whether the negative or positive effect dominates.
Proposition 2.8 Suppose that the number of competing firms increases.
• If the weight of the public good’s production costs is relatively high (f > c22b),
then the profits of the incumbents decrease.
• If the weight of the public good’s production costs is relatively low (f < c22b),
then the profits of the incumbents increase.
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If f = c
2
2b , then the profits of the incumbents do not change.
Proof. See Appendix.
We know from Proposition 2.6 that market entry reduces each firm’s production
and investment if the weight of the public good cost function is high (f > c
2
2b). Fur-
thermore, the price decreases. Hence, it is obvious that the profits of the incumbents
decrease. This is in line with the usual effect of tougher competition. If f < c
2
2b , we
get the surprising result that the incumbents prefer more competition. This is due
to the fact that the entrant does not only produce the private good, but also invests
in the public good. Hence, the entrant has a positive and negative externality on
the incumbents. If the weight of the public good cost function is small, the positive
external effect dominates the negative one.
Usually higher market prices and higher profits are indices for a lower consumer
surplus and a lower social welfare. Hence, one might think that welfare reacts
ambiguously to market entry due to the fact that the price and the profits can
increase with market entry. Nevertheless, we show that market entry unambiguously
increases social welfare.
Proposition 2.9 If the number of competing firms increases, then the social welfare
increases.
Proof. See Appendix.
If we consider the consumer surplus, we see that it increases in N . This is
due to two effects. Firstly, the quality of the public good increases if market entry
occurs. This leads to a higher private good valuation, which has a positive effect
on the consumer surplus. Secondly, market entry leads to tougher competition in
the proprietary sector. This increases the supply and has again a positive effect on
the consumer surplus. Thus, even if the market entry leads to higher prices, we
get a higher consumer surplus. Proposition 2.8 shows that market entry increases
the profits of the firms if the public good’s production costs have a low weight.
Hence, social welfare increases. If the firms’ profits decrease with market entry, the
gain in the consumer surplus dominates. Therefore, market entry is always welfare
enhancing.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have studied the incentive to invest in a non-excludable public
good that is complementary to a private good. We have shown that an increase of
the government investment in the public good leads to ambiguous results. Firms
may decrease their investment and a crowding out may occur. In this case the gov-
ernment investment is a strategic substitute to the investment of the firms. However,
it is also possible that it is a strategic complement. Hence, firms may invest more in
the public good if the government increases its public good investment. This leads
to the following policy implication: If a government thinks about supporting Open
Source Software by directly investing, then the concern that a crowding out occurs
can be without any reason. Exactly the opposite can be true. The government in-
vestment can induce the firms to increase their investment in the public good and to
increase their private good supply. Furthermore, we have considered market entry.
We have shown that an entrant has positive and negative pecuniary externalities on
the incumbents. Therefore, market entry can increase the profits of the incumbents.
Our analysis sheds new light on the incentives to license a proprietary prod-
uct to horizontal competitors. Usually it is argued that licensing gives incumbents
a commitment device to higher quality or, in network industries, to a bigger net-
work by inducing competition. This results in an overall higher demand and offsets
the loss in market power.11 Another argument arises from our paper. A firm can
use licensing to induce market entry. The incumbent anticipates that the entrant
does not only produce the private good, but also invests in public goods like e.g.
cooperative advertising. This public good investment can make up for the tougher
competition in the proprietary sector. Hence, it may increase the incumbent’s profit.
In this context, we would highlight the advertising campaign of Apple in the year
1981 as an example of such a ”warm welcome” of competition. Apple Computer had
responded to the entry of IBM in the PC Market with full-page newspaper advertise-
ments, ”Welcome IBM. Seriously.”(See Figure 2.1). In these advertisements Apple
claims that there will be a huge market as soon as the people understand the value
of a PC. It seems that Apple thought that IBM will help them to convince people,
”We look forward to responsible competition in the massive effort to distribute this
American technology to the world”. This is in line with our argumentation if one
interprets the meaning of ”responsible competition” as helping to convince people,
11See e.g. Shepard (1987) and Economides (1997).
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and not as selling only proprietary products. Hence, IBM takes part in the private
provision of the non-excludable public good ”knowledge” or ”awareness”.
Figure 2.1: Advertisement of Apple
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2.7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1:
We proceed in two steps. Firstly, we prove existence. Secondly, we show uniqueness.
1. Existence:
Given xi ∈ [0;xi] and yi ∈ [0; yi], it follows that the strategy spaces are nonempty
compact convex subsets of R2. Furthermore, by assumption, the profit function is
continuous. Given a strictly concave profit function, it follows directly that the
profit functions satisfy the quasi-concavity criteria. It follows that there exists a
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (Debreu (1952)).
2. Uniqueness
To show uniqueness we apply the contraction mapping approach. Due to Bert-
sekas (1999) it is sufficient to show that the Hessian of the profit functions fulfills
the ”diagonal dominance” condition.
H =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2π1
∂x1∂x1
∂2π1
∂x1∂y1
∂2π1
∂x1∂x2
∂2π1
∂x1∂y2
... ∂
2π1
∂x1∂xn
∂2π1
∂x1∂yn
∂2π1
∂y1∂x1
∂2π1
∂y1∂y1
∂2π1
∂y1∂x2
∂2π1
∂y1∂y2
... ∂
2π1
∂y1∂xn
∂2π1
∂y1∂yn
∂2π2
∂x2∂x1
∂2π2
∂x2∂y1
∂2π2
∂x2∂x2
∂2π2
∂x2∂y2
... ∂
2π2
∂x2∂xn
∂2π2
∂x2∂yn
∂2π2
∂y2∂x1
∂2π2
∂y2∂y1
∂2π2
∂y2∂x2
∂2π2
∂y2∂y2
... ∂
2π2
∂y2∂xn
∂2π2
∂y2∂yn
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
∂2πn
∂xn∂x1
∂2πn
∂xn∂y1
∂2πn
∂xn∂x2
∂2πn
∂xn∂y2
... ∂
2πn
∂xn∂xn
∂2πn
∂xn∂yn
∂2πn
∂yn∂x1
∂2πn
∂yn∂y1
∂2πn
∂yn∂x2
∂2πn
∂yn∂y2
... ∂
2πn
∂yn∂xn
∂2πn
∂yn∂yn
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Therefore, the diagonal of the Hessian dominates the off-diagonal entries if
N∑
j=1,i 6=j
| ∂
2πi
∂xi∂xj
|+
N∑
j=1
| ∂
2πi
∂xi∂yj
| < | ∂
2πi
∂xi∂xi
|, ∀i
and if
N∑
j=1
| ∂
2πi
∂yi∂xj
|+
N∑
j=1,i6=j
| ∂
2πi
∂yi∂yj
| < | ∂
2πi
∂yi∂yi
|, ∀i
Calculating the derivatives leads to
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N∑
j=1,i6=j
|xi ∂
2p
∂xi∂xj
+
∂p
∂xj
|+
N∑
j=1
|xi ∂
2p
∂xi∂yj
+
∂p
∂yj
| < | ∂
2p
∂xi∂xi
xi +2
∂p
∂xi
− ∂
2Kx(xi)
∂xi∂xi
|, ∀i
(N−1)|xi ∂
2p
∂xi∂xj
+
∂p
∂xj
|+N |xi ∂
2p
∂xi∂yj
+
∂p
∂yj
| < −( ∂
2p
∂xi∂xi
xi+2∗ ∂p
∂xi
)+
∂2Kx(xi)
∂xi∂xi
, ∀i
(N − 1)|xi ∂
2p
∂xi∂xj
+
∂p
∂xj
|+N |xi ∂
2p
∂xi∂yj
+
∂p
∂yj
|+( ∂
2p
∂xi∂xi
xi +2
∂p
∂xi
) <
∂2Kx(xi)
∂xi∂xi
, ∀i
Calculating the derivatives leads to
N∑
j=1,i6=j
|xi ∂
2p
∂yi∂xj
|+ |xi ∂
2p
∂yi∂xi
+
∂p
∂xi
|+
N∑
j=1,i6=j
|xi ∂
2p
∂yi∂yi
| < |xi ∂
2p
∂yi∂yi
− ∂
2Kyi (yi)
∂yi∂yi
|, ∀i
(N−1)|xi ∂
2p
∂yi∂xj
|+|xi ∂
2p
∂yi∂xi
+
∂p
∂xi
|+(N−1)|xi ∂
2p
∂yi∂yj
| < |xi ∂
2p
∂yi∂yi
− ∂
2Kyi (yi)
∂yi∂yi
|, ∀i
(N−1)|xi ∂
2p
∂yi∂xj
|+|xi ∂
2p
∂yi∂xi
+
∂p
∂xi
|+(1−N)xi ∂
2p
∂yi∂yj
< −(xi ∂
2p
∂yi∂yi
)+
∂2Kyi (yi)
∂yi∂yi
, ∀i
(N − 1)|xi ∂
2p
∂yi∂xj
|+ |xi ∂
2p
∂yi∂xi
+
∂p
∂xi
|+ (2−N)xi ∂
2p
∂yi∂yj
<
∂2Kyi (yi)
∂yi∂yi
,∀i
Proof of Proposition 2.2
We proceed in two steps. Firstly, we prove existence. Secondly, we show a multi-
plicity of equilibria.
1. Existence
See first part of the proof of Proposition 2.1.
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2. Multiplicity
We proceed in 4 steps:
Step 1:
Due to the first technical assumption in the Proposition 2.2, we have a contraction
mapping of the best reply functions with respect to the private good. This leads to
a unique Nash Equilibrium x∗ = (x∗i , x
∗
2, ..., x
∗
N ).
Step 2:
By the proof of existence, we know that there exists at least one Nash Equilibrium
in pure strategies. Therefore, we can assume that
s∗ = ((x∗1, y
∗
1), (x
∗
2, y
∗
2), ..., (x
∗
j , y
∗
j ), (x
∗
k, y
∗
k), ..., (x
∗
N , y
∗
N ))
is a Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies.
Step 3:
We define y′j = yj + µ and y
′
k = yk − µ with µ 6= 0.
s∗ implies that the FOCs of every firm i ∈ {1, ..., N} has to be fulfilled at the
values of s∗:
∂πi
∂xi
|s∗= ∂Ri
∂xi
− ∂K
x
∂xi
= 0
∂πi
∂yi
|s∗= ∂Ri
∂yi
− ∂K
y
j
∂yi
= 0
If this is the case, then these first order conditions are also fulfilled with the
values s′ = ((x∗1, y
∗
1), (x
∗
2, y
∗
2), ..., (x
∗
j , y
′
j), (x
∗
k, y
′
k), ..., (x
∗
N , y
∗
N )).
This is the case because Y =
∑N
i=1 yi does not change. The marginal costs of
yi are always constant and the same for all firms. Furthermore, the firms’ marginal
revenues do not change.
xi
∂p
∂yi
|Y = const.
This leads to the conclusion that all first order conditions are fulfilled at s′.
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Step 4:
Now one can go back to Step 3 and repeat the procedure with s′ instead of s∗.
By repeating Step 3 and 4 it is obvious that there exist an infinite number of
equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 2.3
Firstly, we prove that the described equilibrium is indeed a Nash Equilibrium. Sec-
ondly, we show that this is the unique Nash Equilibrium by ruling out all other
possible equilibria.
1. Is (x∗i = x
∗
−i, yi = Y
∗, y∗−i = 0) an equilibrium?
The FOC of the firms with respect to the public good is
∂πj
∂yj
= x∗j
∂p
∂yj
− ∂K
y
j
∂yj
= 0, j ∈ {i,−i}
Given x∗i = x
∗
−i, it follows that x
∗
i
∂p
∂yi
= x∗−i
∂p
∂y−i . Hence, if
x∗i
∂p
∂yi
|yi=Y ∗=
∂Kyi
∂yi
,
then
x∗−i
∂p
∂y−i
|yi=Y ∗<
∂Ky−i
∂y−i
.
Therefore, (x∗i = x
∗
−i, yi = Y
∗, y∗−i = 0) is an equilibrium.
Next, we rule out all other possible equilibria to show uniqueness. Firstly, we
show that yi and y−i are perfect strategic substitutes. The total derivative of
∂πi
∂yi
= xi
∂p
∂yi
− ∂K
y
i
∂yi
= 0
is
[xi
∂2p
∂y2i
− ∂
2Kyi
∂y2i
]dyi + [xi
∂2p
∂yi∂y−i
− ∂
2Kyi
∂yi∂y−i
]dy−i = 0.
Due to ∂
2Kyi
∂y2i
= ∂
2Kyi
∂yi∂y−i = 0 it is true that
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dyi = −dy−i.
Secondly, we solve the game by iterated deletion of strictly dominated strate-
gies. We denote by y∗i |y−i=0 the optimal response of firm i to y−i = 0. Because of
∂Kyi
∂yi
<
∂Ky−i
∂y−i , it follows that y
∗
−i |yi=0< y∗i |y−i=0.
Hence, firm i knows that firm −i never chooses a higher y−i than y∗−i |yi=0= ymax−i .
Given this, firm i should at least choose ymini = y
∗
i |y−i=0 −ymax−i .
Hence, firm −i knows that firm i never invests less than ymini .
Given this, firm −i should never choose a higher y−i than ymax′−i = y∗−i |yi=ymini .
Hence, firm i knows that firm −i never chooses a higher y−i than ymax′−i .
Given this, the smallest yi that firm i should choose is ymin
′
i = y
∗
i |y−i=0 −ymax
′
−i .
Continuing, one sees that in the limit ymini converges to y
∗
i |y−i=0 and ymax−i converges
to 0. Hence, {(x∗1, y∗1|y2=0), (x∗2, y∗2 = 0)} with y∗1|y2=0 > y∗2|y1=0 is the unique Nash
Equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.4
For the proof we proceed in two steps. Firstly, we show that ∂xi∂yG > 0. Secondly, we
prove that ∂yi∂yG > 0.
1. Using the implicit function theorem combined with symmetry yields
∂xi
∂yG
=
∂x1
∂yG
=
|Dx|
|D|
with
|Dx| =

∂f1/∂yG ∂f
1/∂y1 ∂f
1/∂x2 ∂f
1/∂y2 ... ... ∂f
1/∂xN−1 ∂f1/∂yN−1 ∂f1/∂xN ∂f1/∂yN
∂g1/∂yG ∂g
1/∂y1 ∂g
1/∂x2 ∂g
1/∂y2 ... ... ∂g
1/∂xN−1 ∂g1/∂yN−1 ∂g1/∂xN ∂g1/∂yN
∂f2/∂yG ∂f
2/∂y1 ∂f
2/∂x2 ∂f
2/∂y2 ... ... ∂f
2/∂xN−1 ∂f2/∂yN−1 ∂f2/∂xN ∂f2/∂yN
∂g2/∂yG ∂g
2/∂y1 ∂g
2/∂x2 ∂g
2/∂y2 ... ... ∂g
2/∂xN−1 ∂f4/∂yN−1 ∂g2/∂xN ∂g2/∂yN
. . . . . . . . . .
∂fN /∂yG ∂f
N /∂y1 ∂f
N /∂x2 ∂f
N /∂y2 ... ... ∂f
N /∂xN−1 ∂fN /∂yN−1 ∂fN /∂xN ∂fN /∂yN
∂gN /∂yG ∂g
N /∂y1 ∂g
N /∂x2 ∂g
N /∂y2 ... ... ∂g
N /∂xN−1 ∂gN /∂yN−1 ∂gN /∂xN ∂gN /∂yN
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and
|D| =

∂f1/∂x1 ∂f
1/∂y1 ∂f
1/∂x2 ∂f
1/∂y2 ... ... ∂f
1/∂xN−1 ∂f1/∂yN−1 ∂f1/∂xN ∂f1/∂yN
∂g1/∂x1 ∂g
1/∂y1 ∂g
1/∂x2 ∂g
1/∂y2 ... ... ∂g
1/∂xN−1 ∂g1/∂yN−1 ∂g1/∂xN ∂g1/∂yN
∂f2/∂x1 ∂f
2/∂y1 ∂f
2/∂x2 ∂f
2/∂y2 ... ... ∂f
2/∂xN−1 ∂f2/∂yN−1 ∂f2/∂xN ∂f2/∂yN
∂g2/∂x1 ∂g
2/∂y1 ∂g
2/∂x2 ∂g
2/∂y2 ... ... ∂g
2/∂xN−1 ∂f4/∂yN−1 ∂g2/∂xN ∂g2/∂yN
. . . . . . . . . .
∂fN /∂x1 ∂f
N /∂y1 ∂f
N /∂x2 ∂f
N /∂y2 ... ... ∂f
N /∂xN−1 ∂fN /∂yN−1 ∂fN /∂xN ∂fN /∂yN
∂gN /∂x1 ∂g
N /∂y1 ∂g
N /∂x2 ∂g
N /∂y2 ... ... ∂g
N /∂xN−1 ∂gN /∂yN−1 ∂gN /∂xN ∂gN /∂yN

where f i = ∂πi∂xi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., N} and gi =
∂πi
∂yi
for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., N}.
For the proof that
∂xi
∂yG
=
|Dx|
|D| > 0
we show that the numerator and denominator are positive.
1.1 |Dx| > 0
Using the conditions from Proposition 2.4 we can substitute:
− ∂f
i
∂yG
= −a ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., N}
∂f i
∂yw
= a ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., N}, ∀w ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., N}
∂f i
∂xz
= c ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., N}, ∀z ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., N} \ i
∂f i
∂xi
= e ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., N}
∂gi
∂yG
= 0 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3..., N}
∂gi
∂yi
= b ∀z ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., N}
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∂gi
∂xz
= d ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., N},∀z ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., N}
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−a a c a c a ... ... c a c a
0 b d 0 d 0 ... ... d 0 d 0
−a a e a c a ... ... c a c a
0 0 a b d 0 ... ... d 0 d 0
−a a c a e a ... ... c a c a
0 0 d 0 a b ... ... d 0 d 0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
−a a c a c a ... ... e a c a
0 0 d 0 d 0 ... ... a b d 0
−a a c a c a ... ... c a e a
0 0 d 0 d 0 ... ... d 0 a b
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
By subtracting line 1 from all lines z with z ∈ {3, 5, 7, ..., N − 1} we derive
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−a a c a c a ... ... c a c a
0 b d 0 d 0 ... ... d 0 d 0
0 0 e− c 0 0 0 ... ... 0 0 0 0
0 0 a b d 0 ... ... d 0 d 0
0 0 0 0 e− c 0 ... ... 0 0 0 0
0 0 d 0 a b ... ... d 0 d 0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 0 0 0 ... ... e− c 0 0 0
0 0 d 0 d 0 ... ... a b d 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 ... ... 0 0 e− c 0
0 0 d 0 d 0 ... ... d 0 a b
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
One sees that there exists a line z (z ∈ {3, 5, 7, ...N}) where only the element
in the z row is not zero. Therefore, we use theses lines to derive a upper triangle
matrix:
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∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−a a c a c a ... ... c a c a
0 b 0 0 d 0 ... ... d 0 d 0
0 0 e− c 0 0 0 ... ... 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 b d 0 ... ... d 0 d 0
0 0 0 0 e− c 0 ... ... 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 b ... ... d 0 d 0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 0 0 0 ... ... e− c 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 ... ... 0 b d 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 ... ... 0 0 e− c 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 ... ... 0 0 0 b
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Hence, the Determinant is
|Dx| = −abN (e− c)N−1
Substituting back gives
if N even:
|Dx| = −
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
[
∂p
∂yi
+ xi
∂2p
∂yi∂xi
]
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
[xi
∂2p
∂y2i
− ∂
2Ki(yi)
∂y2i
]N
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
[
∂p
∂xi
− ∂Ki(xi)
∂x2i
]N−1> 0
if N uneven:
|Dx| = −
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
[
∂p
∂y
+ xi
∂2p
∂yi∂xi
]
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
[xi
∂2p
∂y2i
− ∂
2Ki(yi)
∂y2i
]N
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
[
∂p
∂x
− ∂Ki(xi)
∂x2i
]N−1> 0
Therefore if follows |Dx| > 0 ∀ N .
1.2 |D| > 0
|D| =

∂f1/∂x1 ∂f
1/∂y1 ∂f
1/∂x2 ∂f
1/∂y2 ... ... ∂f
1/∂xN−1 ∂f1/∂yN−1 ∂f1/∂xN ∂f1/∂yN
∂f2/∂x1 ∂f
2/∂y1 ∂f
2/∂x2 ∂f
2/∂y2 ... ... ∂f
2/∂xN−1 ∂f2/∂yN−1 ∂f2/∂xN ∂f2/∂yN
∂f3/∂x1 ∂f
3/∂y1 ∂f
3/∂x2 ∂f
3/∂y2 ... ... ∂f
3/∂xN−1 ∂f3/∂yN−1 ∂f3/∂xN ∂f3/∂yN
∂f4/∂x1 ∂f
4/∂y1 ∂f
4/∂x2 ∂f
4/∂y2 ... ... ∂f
4/∂xN−1 ∂f4/∂yN−1 ∂f4/∂xN ∂f4/∂yN
. . . . . . . . . .
∂fN /∂x1 ∂f
N /∂y1 ∂f
N /∂x2 ∂f
N /∂y2 ... ... ∂f
N /∂xN−1 ∂fN /∂yN−1 ∂fN /∂xN ∂fN /∂yN
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We know that this matrix is diagonally dominant. Furthermore, if a matrix is
diagonal dominant and its diagonal elements are positive, then the matrix is positive
definite. On the diagonal, there are the second-order conditions that are all nega-
tive. Through multiplying every line by (−1) one gets positive diagonal elements
and through the odd number of lines a scalar of +1. This gives a positive definite
matrix. Therefore, the determinant has to be positive.
2.
Total derivative of ∂πi∂yi :
indirect effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
[
∂p
∂yi
+ xi
∂2p
∂xi∂yi
]dxi +[xi
∂2p
∂y2i
− ∂
2Ki(yi)
∂y2i
]dyi
direct effects︷ ︸︸ ︷
+[xi
∂2p
∂yi∂X−i
]dX−i + [xi
∂2p
∂yi∂Y−i
]dY−i= 0
One sees that the direct effect of dY−i is zero. The direct effect of dX−i is
non-negative. The indirect effect of dxi is positive. Therefore, yi has to increase to
ensure that ∂πi∂yi remains zero.
Proof of Lemma 2.1
The existence of a Nash-Equilibrium in pure strategies follows immediately from
Proposition 2.1. For the uniqueness we apply the contraction mapping principle.
Beforehand, we reduce the strategy space form R2 to R because yi is directly deter-
mined through xi. To see this we write down the FOC with respect to the public
good
∂πi
∂yi
= cxi − 2fyi = 0.
Rewriting leads to
yi =
c
2f
xi.
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Plugging back into the profit function of firm i yields
πi = xi(A− bxi − b
N∑
j=1;i6=j
xj + c
c
2f
xi + c
N∑
j=1;i6=j
c
2f
xj)− dx2i − f(
c
2f
xi)2.
The first order conditions of the N firms with respect to the private good are a
contraction mapping if
N∑
j=1;i 6=j
| ∂
2πi
∂xi∂xj
|<| ∂
2πi
∂x2i
| ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N},
(N − 1) | −b + c
2
2f
|<| −2b− 2d + c
2
2f
| .
If f ≥ c22b , then −b + c
2
2f ≤ 0. Therefore:
(1−N)(−b + c
2
2f
) < 2b + 2d− c
2
2f
N <
3b + 2d− c2f
b− c22f
If f < c
2
2b , then −b + c
2
2f > 0. Therefore:
(N − 1)(−b + c
2
2f
) < 2 + 2d− 1
2f
N <
b + 2d
c2
2f − b
Proof of Proposition 2.7
For the proof we use the fact that yi = c2f xi (2.32) and rewrite the demand function
(2.25) as follows:
p = A− bX + cY = A− bX(N) + c c
2f
X(N) = A + X(N)(−b + c
2
2f
)
p = A + N ∗ A
b(1 + N)− 12 c
2
f N + 2d
(−b + c
2
2f
)
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Now we can take the first derivative of p with respect to N yields
∂p
∂N
= (− b + c
2
2f
) ∗ A(b + 2d)
[b(1 + N)− 12 c
2
f N + 2d]
2
.
Therefore:
• ∂p∂N < 0 if f > c
2
2b
• ∂p∂N = 0 if f = c
2
2b → p = A
• ∂p∂N > 0 if f < c
2
2b
Proof of Proposition 2.8
πi = p ∗ xi − dx2 − f [ 12f xi]
2 = p ∗ xi − x2i (d +
1
4f
)
πi =
A2(b + d− c24f )
(b (1 + N)− c22f N + 2d)2
∂πi
∂N
=
A2(b− c22f )(−2b− 2d + c
2
2f )(
b (1 + N)− c22f N + 2d
)3
The last term (−2b−2d+ c22f ) is always negative due to the second order conditions.
Therefore, we have to look at b− c22f and at the denominator.
Case 1: f = c
2
2b
Then b− c22f = 0 and therefore ∂π∂N = 0.
Case 2: f > c
2
2b
Then b− c22f > 0 and the sign of ∂π∂N depends on N due to b (1 + N)− c
2
2f N + 2d.
This term is always positive
b (1 + N)− c
2
2f
N + 2d = b + N(b− c
2
2f
) + 2d.
Therefore, ∂π∂N < 0 for all N > 0.
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Case 3: f < c
2
2b
Then b − c22f < 0 and the sign of ∂π∂N depends on N due to the term b (1 + N) −
c2
2f N + 2d.
This term is zero if
N =
2d + b
c2
2f − b
> 0.
The slope of b (1 + N)− c22f N + 2d with respect to N is
∂(b (1 + N)− c22f N + 2d)
∂N
= b− c
2
2f
< 0.
Therefore, ∂π∂N > 0 in the relevant area where N <
2d+b
c2
2f
−b (Lemma 2.1).
Proof of Proposition 2.9
Firstly, we calculate the consumer surplus
CS = (A + cY − p)X0.5 = 0.5bX2.
The total surplus is the sum of the firms’ profits and the consumers’ surplus
TS = N ∗ πi + CS,
∂TS
∂N
=
∂(N ∗ πi)
∂N
+
∂CS
∂N
,
dTS
dN
= A2
bN(d + c
2
4f ) + (b + d− c
2
4f )(b + . 5
c2
f N + 2d)
(b (1 + N)− . 5 c2f N + 2d)3
> 0.
Chapter 3
Two-Sided Markets with
Pecuniary and Participation
Externalities
3.1 Introduction
A series of recent papers have looked at competition and regulation in the television
and radio broadcasting market by using ”two-sided market” models. In these setups
platforms, which are broadcasting channels, match viewers and advertisers. Viewers
dislike advertisements and competition has the special feature that each platform
has a ”participation externality” on its competitors. If a platform changes its ad-
vertising level, then it influences its own and the competitors’ number of viewers.
This is an externality that works via the viewer market.
In the real world, however, platforms do not only experience participation exter-
nalities, but also pecuniary externalities. In contrast to participation externalities,
which work via the viewer market, pecuniary externalities work via the advertising
market. Hence, we will take into account that a change in a channel’s advertising
level does not only affect the distribution of the viewers between the channels, but
it also changes the broadcasters’ total supply in the advertising market. When the
broadcasters’ total supply changes, then the market price for advertising has to ad-
just in order to clear the market. This price adjustment changes the revenue of all
platforms and yields a pecuniary externality. So far, this pecuniary externality has
39
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been neglected in the existing literature. In this chapter we show that pecuniary
externalities are important because they influence the theoretical predictions sub-
stantially.
In the following we illustrate the existence of pecuniary externalities with two
examples. In Germany, free available public broadcasting channels are competing
with free available private broadcasting channels. The public broadcasting channels
are financed through fees and are not allowed to offer advertising after 8 pm. The
private channels are allowed to offer advertising after 8 pm. The public broadcast-
ing channels are currently running a deficit. Hence, there is a debate in Germany:
Should one increase the fee or should one allow the public broadcasting channels to
offer advertising after 8 pm in order to balance their budget? The position of the
private channels is: Do not allow them to offer advertisements after 8 pm. Instead,
increase the fee or force them to reduce their expenditures! 1 This statement is
surprising. Given our existing knowledge of competition in such a two-sided mar-
ket, advertising after 8 pm decreases the attractiveness of the public channels. The
resulting participation externality should be in the interest of the private channels.
Therefore, private channels should like the idea of advertising on public channels.
However, the neglected aspect here is that private channels fear that the additional
time for commercials decreases the price for advertisements. Due to this pecuniary
externality, they dislike the idea of advertisements on public channels.
The other example is taken from the US television market. In the 70s the
Department of Justice (DOJ) alleged that the ”Code of Conduct” of the National
Association of Broadcasters (NAB), which regulated the competition between the
broadcasting channels, violated antitrust laws.2 In particular the ”Code of Conduct”
included
(i) a limitation of the advertising time on each channel to 9.5 minutes per hour
in prime time and sixteen minutes per hour at all the other times
(ii) a limitation of the number of commercials per hour
(iii) a limitation of the number of advertised products in one hour.
The DOJ argued that these rules had the purpose and effect of manipulating the
supply of commercial television time with the result that the price for advertisements
had been raised. This would violate the Section 1 of the Sherman Act. As a result of
1Press release ”Verband Privater Rundfunkt und Telekommunikation (VPRT), 26.9.2003”
2Campell (1999)
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the allegation and subsequent legal judicial proceedings, the NAB voluntarily aban-
doned its ”Code of Conduct” in the year 1983. From an economic point of view,
these advertising ceilings cannot be explained without pecuniary externalities. In
the existing models, like Anderson and Coate (2005), collusion between the channels
results in an agreement that every channel has to offer a minimum level of advertis-
ing because the equilibrium advertising level is below the the collusive advertising
level. Hence, collusion would not lead to a ”Code of Conduct” that determines a
maximum advertising level.
In order to analyze a two-sided market with both externalities, we build a model
where platforms are symmetrically located on a Salop circle. They simultaneously
decide how much time they offer to advertisers on their channels. The consumers
are uniformly distributed on the circle, dislike advertisements, and have to choose
exactly one platform. Advertisers want to advertise their products. Therefore, they
have a certain willingness to pay for ”viewer-time” units. In our model the crucial
ingredient is that the advertisers’ aggregated demand function for viewer-time units
is decreasing. We show that one can derive such a property from two kinds of mi-
crofoundations. One way is to assume that advertisers have a convex cost function
for producing the advertised good. A second way is to assume word-of-mouth ad-
vertising.3
In this chapter we show that advertising can either have the property of a strate-
gic substitute or of a strategic complement. This is in contrast to the existing litera-
ture like Anderson and Coate (2005). By using linear demand functions, we are able
to solve the model analytically. We show that advertising exhibits the property of
a strategic complement (substitute) in the market equilibrium if the differentiation
between the platforms is low (high). In addition, we show that market entry can
lead to more or less advertising on each channel. This is also in contrast to the
existing literature. For example Choi (2003) shows that market entry unambigu-
ously decreases the advertising level. Furthermore, we get the surprising result that
market entry can increase the incumbents’ profits. This is the case if the equilibrium
advertising level is above the per viewer revenue maximizing advertising level. Due
to the pecuniary externalities, market entry can shift the equilibrium advertising
level in the direction of the per viewer revenue maximizing advertising level. This
increases the profits per viewer. If this increase of the profit is higher than the
decrease of the profit through the loss of viewers, then the incumbents are better
3In the Appendix we consider a third microfoundation, namely switching viewers.
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off. Moreover, we show that entry has ambiguous effects from a welfare point of
view. A social planer has to consider the following trade-off. On the one hand, more
advertising increases the surplus of the advertisers. On the other hand, more ad-
vertising decreases viewers’ utility. We show that perfect competition can drive the
equilibrium advertising level below the socially optimal advertising level. Therefore,
perfect competition may not be desirable even if the sum of viewers’ transportation
costs decrease with market entry.
This chapter is related to the literature on two-sided markets. The basic litera-
ture describes the interaction between two groups that are mediated by a platform
(see e.g. Armstrong (2005), Cauillad and Jullien (2003), Nocke et.al. (2004), Rochet
and Tirole (2003, 2004)). The media market, and particularly the broadcasting mar-
ket, is a subclass of such a two-sided market because it has a special feature. One
side, namely advertisers, likes the interaction with the second side, namely viewers.
At the same time viewers dislike the interaction with advertisers.4
Several papers have addressed this peculiarity of the broadcasting market. Usu-
ally the advertising market is modelled in such a way that advertisers have no bar-
gaining power and take the decisions (advertising prices or quantities) of the channels
as given5 and viewers dislike advertising.6 Papers that consider price competition
are Reisinger (2004), Nilssen and Sorgard (2001) and Kind et.al. (2005). Given the
structure of the US TV advertising market, we argue that the assumption of quantity
competition seems to better fit reality. Papers that consider quantity competition
are e.g. Anderson and Coate (2005), Anderson (2005), Gabszewicz et.al. (2004),
Crampes et.al. (2004), Choi (2003), Peitz and Valetti (2004), and Kohlschein (2004).
All papers that consider quantity competition have a similar microfoundation of ad-
vertising, which we describe in Section 3.3. Hereafter, we refer to these papers as the
existing literature. Anderson and Coate (2005) prove that there could be too much
or too little advertising compared to the social optimum. Anderson (2005) considers
how advertising ceilings influence the quality decisions of the broadcasting channels.
Choi (2003) looks at the endogenous number of broadcasting channels. Kohlschein
(2004) considers competition between public and private channels. Gabszewicz et.al.
4By contrast, there is often the assumption that viewers like advertising in models concerned with the
press industry (see e.g. Häckner and Nyberg (2000)).
5One exception is the work of Gal-Or and Dukes (2003, 2006) where platforms and advertisers bargain.
6One paper that differs is Cunningham and Alexander (2004). They use a completely different modelling
approach and incorporate competition in the advertising market, but do not explicitly consider competition
for the viewers.
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(2004), like Peitz and Valetti (2004), consider the location decision of the channels.
Crampes et.al. (2004) allow for (dis)economies of scale of advertising. By including
pecuniary externalities between the platforms, we extend the framework that is used
in the existing literature.
We will proceed as follows. In the next section we set up the model. In Section
3 we provide different microfoundations for pecuniary externalities. In Section 4
we solve the model and derive the symmetric market equilibrium. In Section 5
we determine whether advertising exhibits the property of a strategic substitute or
complement. In Section 6 we consider the effects of market entry on platforms’
profits and on welfare. Section 7 concludes.
3.2 The Model
There are three kinds of agents in our model: viewers, broadcasting channels and
advertisers.
Viewers of a broadcasting channel, who are potential consumers of the adver-
tisers, can watch one channel at a certain point in time. In the two-sided market
framework this means that they singlehome. The viewers are heterogeneous with
respect to their preferences of watching a certain channel. Hence, we assume that
they are uniformly distributed on a Salop circle. We denote by x the location of a
viewer on this circle. The mass of consumers is normalized to 1. This leads to the
following utility of a viewer that watches channel i and is located at 0:
U(x) = B − wi − tx. (3.1)
We denote by wi the advertising level of channel i. Due to the fact that adver-
tising is annoying, wi enters the utility function with a negative sign. Furthermore,
we denote by tx the viewer’s disutility from not watching exactly his preferred pro-
gramm. B is a constant which ensures that the utility is always positive. We
normalize the outside option to U = 0 and hence the market is always covered.
Furthermore, we assume that the N broadcasting channels are located equidistantly
on the Salop circle. Therefore, the marginal consumer between channel i and j for
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wj − tN ≤ wi ≤ wj + tN is
B − wi − tx = B − wj − t( 1
N
− x). (3.2)
The marginal consumer between channel i and l for wl − tN ≤ wi ≤ wl + tN is
B − wi − tx = B − wl − t( 1
N
− x). (3.3)
Hence, channel i faces the following demand function
Di(wi, wj , wl) = 2x =
1
N
+
wj − wi
2t
+
wl − wi
2t
(3.4)
for wl − tN ≤ wi ≤ wl + tN and wj − tN ≤ wi ≤ wj + tN .
Using symmetry between channels j and l yields
Di =
1
N
+
wl − wi
t
for wl − t
N
≤ wi ≤ wl + t
N
. (3.5)
Broadcasting channels try to attract viewers in order to sell time of these viewers
to the advertisers. Therefore, the profit function of a channel i is
πi = Diwip . (3.6)
By p we denote the ”viewer-time” unit price. If one multiplies the number of
viewers of a channel (= Di) by the advertising time (= wi), then this yields the
channel i’s supply of viewer-time units. This supply multiplied by the price per
viewer-time unit yields the channel i’s profit. We assume zero marginal costs for
serving a viewer. This is due to the public good nature of broadcasting. Further-
more, we abstract from fixed costs. The channels choose wi in order to maximize
their profits, taking as given the other channels advertising levels.
The advertisers advertise in order to inform viewers about their products. There-
fore, they have a willingness to pay for viewer-time units in order to reach consumers.
We assume that viewer-time units are a homogenous good, which we justify with
our microfoundation. Furthermore, we assume that the advertisers’ inverse demand
function for viewer-time units is decreasing in the total supply of viewer-time units
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p = p(w1D1, w2D2, ..., wNDN ), (3.7)
∂p
∂wiDi
< 0 , ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. (3.8)
We are able to solve the model analytically with the following linear demand
function, which we will use throughout the chapter.
p = A−
N∑
k=1
wkDk. (3.9)
To model the television market, we choose the following time structure. Firstly,
the channels choose simultaneously their advertising levels wi.7 Secondly, the view-
ers decide which channel to watch. Thirdly, a price p, which is determined by a
walrasian auctioneer, clears the market in such a way that the supply of viewer-time
units is equal to the advertisers’ demand for viewer-time units.
We think that this is the appropriate time structure to model the television
market. Goettler (1998) describes how the television advertising market works in
the US. The broadcasting channels present their programm schedule in the so called
”Upfront Market”, which is in May for the upcoming season in September. 70% to
80% of the advertising time is sold during this upfront market at a market clearing
price.8 The rest is sold in the ”scatter market” some weeks before the advertising
slot is aired or is used to promote the channel’s own movies and shows.
3.3 Microfoundation of the Advertisers’ De-
mand Function
The main difference to the existing literature is our inverse demand function of
the advertisers. In the existing literature it is assumed that the price of a viewer-
time unit on channel i is only decreasing in wi, but independent of Di, wj and
7Consider e.g. that a channel decides to produce, or to buy a sitcom, that is 25 minutes long. If the
channel starts this sitcom at 8 pm and starts the next show on the channel at 8.30 pm, then the channel
commits to 5 minutes advertising.
8To quote from one report about the upfront market: ”If supply exceeds demand in the network Upfront,
then let the suppliers battle among themselves to the advantage of advertisers.” Source: Jack Myers Report,
April 5, 2004 (www.jackmyers.com)
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Dj , ∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}/i
pi = pi(wi), (3.10)
∂pi
∂wi
< 0,
∂pi
∂Di
= 0, (3.11)
∂pi
∂Dj
= 0,
∂pi
∂wj
= 0 ∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}/i. (3.12)
Hence, no pecuniary externalities appear because a change in wi does not influ-
ence the price pj on a channel j. In the following we explain the microfoundation
of the existing literature. Afterwards we show how one derives pecuniary external-
ities due to simple modifications of the existing microfoundation.9 Therefore, we
think that having no pecuniary externalities is an artefact of the particular micro-
foundation that is used in the existing literature. Hence, in our opinion pecuniary
externalities should be the expected case.
Following Bagwell (2003), we can distinguish between three views of advertising:
the persuasive view, the informative view, and the complementary view. As the ex-
isting literature, we concentrate on the informative view. In the existing models an
advertiser g produces one product with constant marginal costs. This product has
no substitute. Viewers are unaware of this product and advertising has the function
of informing a viewer about the existence of this product. By seeing a commercial of
an advertiser g, a viewer learns about the existence of this product. Each viewer has,
by assumption, the same valuation vg for one unit of a product of firm g. A viewer’s
valuation is zero for all further units of a product. This is common knowledge. Ob-
viously, an advertiser asks a price vg for his product. Hence, a viewer buys only once
one unit of a product after seeing the corresponding commercial. Given this setup,
each advertiser wants to reach each viewer exactly once. Every additional contact
is useless because the consumer is already informed about the product and never
buys a second unit of this product. Furthermore, it is assumed that the consumers’
valuation vg is different for each kind of product (vg ∈ [v; v]). This assumption leads
to a decreasing aggregated inverse demand function for advertising on one channel
without generating pecuniary externalities between the channels. For example, sup-
pose a price of 10 for one viewer-time unit on a certain channel. Then only the
9In the following we only consider a microfoundation with a convex cost function or with word-of-mouth
advertising. A third possibility are switching viewers. However, given switching viewers, we are not able to
derive that viewer-time units are a homogenous good. We can only justify pecuniary externalities. Therefore,
we consider the case of switching viewers in the Appendix.
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advertisers that have a product vg ≥ 10 advertise on this channel i. If another
channel increases his advertising level, then this does not influence the willingness
to pay of the advertisers to advertise on channel i because the revenue from adver-
tising remains constant. Thus, 10 remains the equilibrium price on channel i and
no pecuniary externalities appear in this existing setup.
In order to derive microfoundations for the pecuniary externalities, we modify
this framework. We assume that all advertisers are homogenous in such a way that
each advertiser has one kind of product for that no substitute exists. Furthermore, a
consumer has the valuation v for exactly one unit of each product. As in the existing
literature, the willingness to pay is zero for further units of a product. Viewers are
unaware of the existence of an advertiser’s product. Advertising has the function
of informing the viewers about its existence. In contrast to the framework above,
we do not assume that a viewer learns for sure that the product exists after he has
seen the product’s commercial. In fact, we take into account that viewers might
be inattentive. Therefore, we assume that a viewer gains knowledge with a certain
probability z after seeing an advertisement. This probability increases in the length
of the commercial. Given the assumption of homogenous advertisers, we can con-
centrate on one representative advertiser g.
In order to derive the advertiser g’s demand function for viewer-time units, we
write down his profit function
πg = v
N∑
k=1
z(wgk)Dk − C(
N∑
k=1
z(wgk)Dk)−
N∑
k=1
pkwgkDk . (3.13)
By wgi we denote the advertiser g’s advertising level on channel i. The adver-
tising level wgi determines the probability z = z(wgi) with which a consumer gets
aware of the advertiser’s product if he watches channel i. If a viewer becomes aware
of the product, we know that his product valuation is v. Obviously, the optimal
price that an advertiser g should ask for his product is v. Hence, the first term dis-
plays the revenue of selling the advertised good, the second the costs of producing
the advertised good, and the third the costs of advertising.
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Microfoundation 1: Convex Cost Function for Producing the Ad-
vertised Good
Suppose that the probability z increases linearly in wgi
z(wgi) =
wgi
A
. (3.14)
A is a parameter that normalizes the probability z(wgi) ∈ [0; 1]. Hence, the
advertiser g sells
∑N
k=1
wgk
A Dk units at a price of v.
Furthermore, suppose that the advertiser has a strictly convex cost function for
producing the advertised good10
C ′(
N∑
k=1
wgk
A
Dk) ≥ 0; C ′′(
N∑
k=1
wgk
A
Dk) > 0. (3.15)
This yields the following profit function
πg = v
N∑
k=1
wgk
A
Dk − C(
N∑
k=1
wgk
A
Dk)−
N∑
k=1
pkwgkDk . (3.16)
The advertiser maximizes his profit by his choice of wgiDi. Therefore, maximiz-
ing the advertiser g’s profit function with respect to wgiDi leads to his willingness
to pay for the last viewer-time unit on channel i11
pi =
v
A
− C ′ . (3.17)
We see that viewer-time units are a homogenous good because C ′ does not
depend on the particular channel i. Therefore, the prices for viewer-time units have
to be the same on all channels
pi = p ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. (3.18)
10Armstrong (2004) mentions this idea in the context why the advertisers’ payoffs need not to be constant.
Cunningham and Alexander (2004) also use a convex cost funtion in their setup.
11The SOC is globally satisfied.
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Furthermore, the inverse demand function p = vA − C ′ is decreasing in wgiDi
∂p
∂wgiDi
= −C ′′ < 0 , ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} . (3.19)
Summing up, we see that the broadcasting channels have pecuniary externalities
given increasing marginal costs for producing the advertised good. The intuition
for the pecuniary externality is obvious. If an advertiser g increases his advertising
level on a channel, then the advertising firm g sells more products. Hence, the firm
g’s willingness to pay for the last viewer-time unit decreases on all channels because
his marginal costs are higher compared to the situation before.
In order to derive the linear demand function
p = A−
N∑
k=1
wkDk, (3.20)
suppose that a consumer has the valuation v = A2. Furthermore, we assume
that the cost function for producing the advertised good is
C(
N∑
k=1
zg(wgk)Dk) =
A2
2
(
N∑
k=1
wgk
A
Dk)2 . (3.21)
Plugging into the profit function yields
πg = A2
N∑
k=1
wgk
A
Dk − A
2
2
(
N∑
k=1
wgk
A
Dk)2 −
N∑
k=1
pwgkDk . (3.22)
Maximizing with respect to wgiDi and solving for p leads to
p = A−
N∑
k=1
wgkDk . (3.23)
Summing up over all M advertisers yields the aggregated inverse demand func-
tion
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p = A−
N∑
k=1
wkDk . (3.24)
Microfoundation 2: Word-of-Mouth Advertising
Another way to give a microfoundation is word-of-mouth advertising. In the fol-
lowing we assume that the marginal costs for producing the advertised good are
constant. We normalize these costs to zero without loss of generality.
The idea behind the word-of-mouth advertising setup is that a viewer can learn
about the existence of a certain product in two different ways. On the one hand, he
can become aware of the product through advertising. On the other hand, he can
become aware of it by recognizing that another person has bought this product. In
order to capture this idea, we extend the model by introducing two periods. In the
first period the viewers are exposed to the advertising spots of the different firms.
Depending on the length of advertisement wgi, they buy the product of advertiser
g with probability z(wgi) =
wgi
A . In the second period we assume that always pairs
of viewers meet each other. In particular each viewer meets one other viewer. A
viewer sees whether the other viewer has bought a product of firm g or not. Suppose
that a viewer has not become aware of the product in the first period and meets a
viewer in the second period who has bought the product in the first period. Given
this, the non-buyer of the first period becomes aware of the product and also buys
it. Such a constellation, where a non-buyer meets a buyer, is the only possibility
how sales occur in the second period. Formalizing this idea leads to the following
profit function of an advertiser g
πg = v[
N∑
k=1
Dk
wgi
A
+
N∑
k=1
Dk(1−
wgk
A
)
N∑
j=i
Dj
wgj
A
]−
N∑
k=1
pkwgkDk . (3.25)
Maximizing with respect to wgkDk leads to
pk = v(
Effect 1︷︸︸︷
1
A
+
Effect 2︷ ︸︸ ︷
(− 1
A
N∑
k=1
Dk
wgk
A
) +
Effect 3︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
A
N∑
k=1
Dk(1−
wgk
A
)) . (3.26)
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We see that if channel k increases his supply of viewer-time units, then three
effects appear:
Effect 1: The probability increases that a viewer of this channel buys the prod-
uct in the first period.
Effect 2: The probability decreases that a viewer of this channel buys the prod-
uct in the second period 2. This is due to the fact that it is less likely that a viewer
of channel k does not buy in the first period.
Effect 3: The probability increases that a non-buyer meets a buyer in the second
period.
The sum of the three effects multiplied by the price v yields the marginal revenue
of advertising on channel k. This is the advertiser’s willingness to pay for the last
viewer-time unit on channel k. We see that viewer-time units are a homogenous
good because the willingness to pay for the last viewer-time unit is the same on all
channels
p = pi ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}. (3.27)
Furthermore, simplifying 3.26 yields
p = 2
v
A
(1−
N∑
i=1
Di
wgi
A
) . (3.28)
We see that the inverse demand function is decreasing in wgiDi
∂p
∂wgiDi
= −2 v
A2
< 0 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} . (3.29)
In particular there are two reasons why the willingness to pay decreases if the supply
increases:
Reason 1: It is less attractive to increase the probability that a viewer buys in
the first period because the probability that he meets a buyer in the second period
increases (= − 1
A2
).
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Reason 2: It is less attractive to increase the probability that a viewer buys the
product in the first period because the probability that this buyer meets a non-buyer
in the second period decreases (= − 1
A2
).
As the microfoundation with a convex cost function, this mircrofoundation yields
the linear demand function with which we work later on. Suppose that the con-
sumers’ valuation is
v =
A2
2
. (3.30)
This yields the following profit of advertiser g
πg =
A2
2
[
N∑
k=1
Dk
wgk
A
+
N∑
k=1
Dk(1−
wgk
A
)
N∑
j=1
Dj
wgj
A
]−
N∑
k=1
pwgkDk . (3.31)
Maximizing with respect to wgkDk leads to
p = A−
N∑
k=1
wgkDk . (3.32)
Summing up over all M advertisers yields the linear inverse demand function
p = A−
N∑
k=1
wkDk . (3.33)
3.4 Competition in Advertising Levels
In this section we look at the profit maximization problem of the channels and we
solve the model for the symmetric market equilibrium. The broadcasting channel i
has the following maximization problem
max
wi
πi = Diwip, (3.34)
with
Di =
1
N
+
wj − wi
2t
+
wl − wi
2t
for wj − t
N
≤ wi ≤ wj + t
N
(3.35)
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and
p = A−
N∑
k=1
wkDk. (3.36)
The first order condition of channel i can be written as
∂πi
∂wi
=
∂Di
∂wi
pwi + Di
∂(pwi)
∂wi
= 0 . (3.37)
Hence, the optimal advertising level solves the trade-off between losing the rev-
enue from a viewer and increasing the revenue per viewer.
Another possibility to express the first order condition of channel i is
∂πi
∂wi
=
Scale Up Effect︷︸︸︷
Dip +
Quantity Effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂Di
∂wi
wip +
Price Effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
Diwi
∂p
∂wi
+ Diwi
∂p
∂Di
∂Di
∂wi
+ Diwi(
∂p
∂Dj
∂Dj
∂wi
+
∂p
∂Dl
∂Dl
∂wi
)= 0. (3.38)
To understand this FOC, we consider a ”One-Sided Market” maximization prob-
lem. Usually the marginal revenue, R = pq, exhibits in a ”One-Sided Market”,
depending on the kind of strategic variable, a simple trade-off:
• Suppose that the quantity q is the strategic variable, so R(q) = p(q)q. If a
firm increases q, then it sells one more unit (=Scale Up Effect), but every unit
at a smaller price (=Price Effect)
∂R
∂q
=
Scale Up Effect︷︸︸︷
p +
Price Effect︷︸︸︷
∂p
∂q
q . (3.39)
• Suppose that the price p is the strategic variable, so R(p) = pq(p). If a firm
increases p, then it sells all units at a marginal higher price (=Scale Up Effect),
but only a smaller number of units (=Quantity Effect)
∂R
∂p
=
Scale Up Effect︷︸︸︷
q +
Quantity Effect︷︸︸︷
∂q
∂p
p . (3.40)
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In our two-sided-market setup we have the combination of a price and a quantity
competition. The advertising level is a kind of price for the viewers. For the adver-
tisers it is, multiplied by the number of viewers, the supply. This is reflected in the
the first order condition. There we have, beside the ”Scale Up Effect”, the ”Price
Effect” as well as the ”Quantity Effect”. For the ”Price Effect” we have to take into
account that if a channel i increases its advertising level, then it directly increases
the supply of viewer-time units (=direct effect). But furthermore, it changes the
distribution of the viewers on the channels. This changes the supply of viewer-time
units, which has a further impact on the price (=indirect effect).
∂p
∂wi
=
direct effect︷︸︸︷
∂p
∂wi
+
indirect effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂p
∂Di
∂Di
∂wi
+
∂p
∂Dj
∂Dj
∂wi
+
∂p
∂Dl
∂Dl
∂wi
(3.41)
with l and j as the neighbors of i.
In order to derive the symmetric market equilibrium, we look at the correspond-
ing first order condition
∂πi
∂wi
|w∗1=w∗2=...=w∗N =
1
N
p∗ − 1
t
w∗i p
∗ +
1
N
w∗i
∂p∗
∂w∗i
= 0. (3.42)
Using the specified demand functions, we can solve for the symmetric equilibrium
advertising level w∗i .
Proposition 3.1 Assume that the viewers’ demand function is (with −i as the
symmetric neighbors of i)
Di =
1
N
+
w−i − wi
t
for w−i − t
N
≤ wi ≤ w−i + t
N
(3.43)
and that the advertisers’ inverse demand function is
p = A−
N∑
k=1
Dkwk. (3.44)
The advertising level
w∗i =
(Nt + t + N2A)−
√
(Nt + t + N2A)2 − 4N3tA
2N2
(3.45)
is the unique symmetric Nash-Equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
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3.5 Has Advertising the Property of a Strate-
gic Substitute or Complement?
In the existing literature advertising has the property of a strategic complement.
In these setups advertising is a kind of price for the consumers and no pecuniary
externality appears. Hence, as in price competition, each channel decreases his ad-
vertising level if another channel decreases his advertising level. In the following we
show that it is not obvious that advertising has the property of a strategic comple-
ment given pecuniary and participation externalities.
For simplicity we consider a duopoly (N = 2). We denote the two channels by
{i;−i}. Whether we have strategic substitutes or complements depends on the sign
of
∂2πi
∂wi∂w−i
=
∂p
∂w−i
∂(Diwi)
∂wi
+
∂Di
∂w−i
∂(pwi)
∂wi
+ wi[
∂2Di
∂wi∂w−i
p + Di
∂2p
∂w−i∂wi
] Q 0.
(3.46)
We see that channel −i influences the price function p and the demand function
Di. This has four consequences:
• it changes the price p (= ∂p∂w−i )
• it changes the number of viewers of channel i (= ∂Di∂w−i )
• it changes the impact of firm i on the price p (= ∂2p∂wi∂w−i )
• it changes the impact of firm i on the number of viewers Di (= ∂2Di∂wi∂w−i )
The change in the price p influences the incentive to change the quantity of
viewer-time units (∂(Diwi)∂wi ). If the price decreases, then it gets less desirable to have
more viewer-time units. The change in the number of viewers Di changes the in-
centive to change the revenue per viewer ∂(pwi)∂wi . Given more viewers, it gets more
preferable to have a high revenue per viewer. Furthermore, the changes of the im-
pact of the advertising level on the audience size and on the price have an additional
effect on the incentives to change the advertising level. The number of viewers that
one loses with a higher advertising level changes. Moreover, the impact of an in-
crease in the advertising level on the price changes.
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With our specified viewers’ demand function, we have that ∂Di∂w−i =
1
t given
w−i − t2 ≤ wi ≤ w−i + t2 and ∂
2Di
∂wi∂w−i = 0 because
Di =



1 if wi < w−i − w−it
1
2 +
w−i−wi
t if w−i − t2 ≤ wi ≤ w−i + t2
0 if w−i + t2 < wi
. (3.47)
Furthermore, given the specified advertisers’ demand function p = A−∑Nk=1 Dkwk,
the cross derivative is ∂
2p
∂wi∂w−i = −2t for w−i − t2 ≤ wi ≤ w−i + t2 . We cannot make
any statement about the sign of ∂p∂wi and
∂p
∂w−i without knowing the actual values of
wi and w−i because
∂p
∂wi
=



−1 if wi < w−i − t2
−Di + wit − w−it ≤ 0 if w−i − t2 ≤ wi ≤ w−i + t4
−Di + wit − w−it > 0 if w−i + 14 t < wi ≤ w−i + t2
0 if w−i + t2 < wi
. (3.48)
Hence, it is possible that the price per viewer-time unit increases if a channel
extends his advertising level. To illustrate this point, suppose two channels. As-
sume that channel 1 has a higher advertising level than channel 2 in such a way that
channel 1 has only ”one” remaining viewer. If channel 1 increases his advertising
level even further, then this last viewer switches to channel 2. Thus, the higher
advertising level of channel 1 decreases the aggregated supply of viewer-time units
and increases the market price p.
Let us now determine the reaction function of channel i: w∗i = w
∗
i (w−i). In order
to do this, we have to distinguish between three cases:
Case 1: w−i > wH−i =
A
2 +
t
2
Suppose that w−i > A2 +
t
2 . We can calculate that wi =
A
2 maximizes channel
i’s revenue per viewer. Furthermore, we have that
Di(wi =
A
2
; w−i ≥ wH−i) = 1 .
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Hence, wi = A2 has to be channel i’s best response. If channel i chooses wi =
A
2 ,
then he all viewers watch his program and he has the highest possible revenue per
viewer.
Case 2: wH−i ≥ w−i ≥ wC−i = 74 t + 12A− 14
√
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2)
In this second case w−i is not high enough to allow channel i to choose wi = A2
and still to have Di = 1. Given this w−i, the profit of channel i decreases in wi
( ∂πi∂wi < 0). A higher advertising level leads to a lower number of viewers and the
change in the revenue per viewer cannot make up for this loss. Hence, reducing the
advertising level increases the profit as long as Di < 1. Therefore, we derive a corner
solution w∗i (w−i) = w−i − t2 where Di = 1.
Case 3: w−i < wC−i =
7
4 t +
1
2A− 14
√
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2)
In Case 3 we have an interior solution. The reaction function can be calculated
and is
wCase3i = (1 +
1
48
t2 +
5
24
w−it− 16At +
1
16
w2−i)[
3
64
tw2−i −
1
16
w−iAt− 164w
3
−i +
1
576
[1440t4w−iA + 1296Atw4−i − 432A2t2w2−i + 2376w3−it2A
−5760w−it3A2 + 7632t3Aw2−i − 3540t3w3−i − 3t6 − 90t5w−i − 927t4w2−i − 576t4A2 −
2052t2w4−i − 1296w5−it + 1536A3t3 + 72t5A]
1
2 ]
1
3 +
1
4
t +
3
4
w−i
We summarize these findings in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2 In a duopoly with
Di =



1 if wi < w−i + t2
1
2 +
w−i−wi
t if w−i − t2 ≤ wi ≤ w−i + t2
0 if w−i + t2 < wi
(3.49)
and
p = A−Diwi −D−iw−i, (3.50)
the best response function w∗i (w−i) of platform i is
CHAPTER 3. TWO-SIDED MARKETS 58
w∗i =



A
2 if w
H
−i =
A
2 +
t
2 < w−i
w−i − t2 if wH−i ≤ w−i ≤ wC−i
wCase3i :=interior solution if w−i < w
C
−i =
7
4 +
A
2 − 14
√
25t2 + 4At + 4A2
.(3.51)
Proof. See Appendix.
In the first case it is obvious that advertising is neither a strategic substitute
nor a strategic complement. In the second case we have, due to the corner solution,
a perfect strategic complement. Whether advertising exhibits the property of a
strategic complement or substitute in the case of an interior solution depends on the
actual values of wi and w−i. We have plotted two numerical examples to illustrate
this (see Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1: Strategic Substitute or Complement
Given a high differentiation parameter (t = 200), we see that advertising can
be either a strategic substitute or complement. In the corresponding equilibrium,
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w∗i = 50, it is a strategic substitute. In contrast, advertising exhibits the property
of a strategic complement given a low differentiation (t = 10). However, we are
able to derive analytical results whether advertising has the property of a strategic
substitute or complement in a symmetric market equilibrium.
Proposition 3.3 In the symmetric Nash-Equilibrium of a duopoly advertising has
the property of a
• strategic substitute if differentiation between platforms is relatively high
(t > 47(2
√
2− 1)A)
• strategic complement if the differentiation between platforms is relatively low
(t < 47(2
√
2− 1)A)
Proof. See Appendix.
If one considers the advertising market, then one expects that advertising has
the property of a strategic substitute because channels compete in quantities. In
contrast, if one considers the viewer market, then one expects the property of a
strategic complement because advertising is a kind of price for the viewers. The
intuition of the proposition is the following. Due to the fact that we consider a sym-
metric situation, no effects that result from asymmetric advertising levels appear.
Furthermore, suppose that the differentiation is high. In this case a change in the
advertising level has no big impact on the viewer side and the effects of the adver-
tising market dominate. Advertising has on the advertising market the property of
a strategic substitute. Therefore, we have exactly this property if the differentiation
is high. If the differentiation is low, then the opposite is true.
3.6 Market Entry
In this section we consider market entry. Given the introduction of Digital Televi-
sion, broadcasting frequencies are no longer a scare resource. Governments use this
to award additional licenses. This yields tougher competition between the broad-
casting channels. Choi (2003) shows, by using the Anderson and Coate (2005)
framework, that market entry leads to a lower advertising level and that it decreases
the profits of the channels. In the following we show that this does not have to be
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true if we take into account pecuniary and participation externalities.
In order to do this, we start by looking at the role of the differentiation param-
eter t and the demand parameter A. If the differentiation parameter t increases,
then the viewers’ demand function gets less elastic. Furthermore, in the symmetric
market equilibrium, the size of the price change ∂p∂wi is independent of t and always
−Di = − 1N . Hence, an increase in t leads to a higher equilibrium advertising level
due to the less elastic demand function.
Additionally, if the parameter A increases, then the equilibrium advertising level
rises because the advertisers’ willingness to pay increases. This has two effects. On
the one hand, it is more attractive to increase the advertising level because the
revenue per advertising unit (= Dip) increases. On the other hand, it is less at-
tractive to increase the advertising level because the revenue per viewer increases
(= wip) and more advertising leads to a smaller audience size. Therefore, the two
effects work in the opposite direction. One can summarize both effects in the term
p∂(Diwi)∂wi . In a symmetric equilibrium we have
dp
dwi
< 0. Therefore, it has to be that
p∂(Diwi)∂wi > 0 in order to fulfill the first order condition. If the price p increases,
then the value of ∂(Diwi)∂wi has to decrease in order to satisfy the first order condition.
We see that the second derivative is negative (∂
2(Diwi)
∂w2i
< 0). Therefore, due to the
higher price p, the revenue per viewer has to decrease, which the channels achieve
by a higher advertising level.
We summarize these findings in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1 If the differentiation between the firms increases, then the equilibrium
advertising level increases
∂w∗i
∂t
> 0.
If the advertisers’ demand function shifts out, then the equilibrium advertising level
increases
∂w∗i
∂A
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
In the following we use Lemma 3.1 to show that market entry can either lead to
a higher level of advertising or a lower level of advertising.
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Proposition 3.4
Market entry yields
• a higher level of advertising (∂w∗i∂N > 0) if the differentiation between the chan-
nels is relatively high (t > 2N
2A
2+N );
• a lower level of advertising (∂w∗i∂N < 0) if the differentiation between the chan-
nels is relatively low (t < 2N
2A
2+N ).
Proof. See Appendix.
To understand the intuition behind this Proposition 3.4, let us consider the first
order condition. In a symmetric equilibrium we have
∂πi
∂wi
|w∗1=...=w∗N = −
1
t
pw∗i +
1
N
∂(w∗i p)
∂wi
= 0. (3.52)
Using the implicit function theorem yields
dw∗(N)
dN
= −−
1
N2
∂(w∗i p)
∂wi
+ 1N
∂
∂(pw∗i )
∂wi
∂N
[SOC]
. (3.53)
Therefore, we see that dw
∗(N)
dN > 0 if
− 1
N2
∂(w∗i p)
∂wi
+
1
N
∂
∂(pw∗i )
∂wi
∂N
> 0. (3.54)
The crucial point is the change of the marginal revenue per viewer multiplied by
the number of viewers (D∗i
∂(w∗i p)
∂wi
). If this term increases, then firms increase their
advertising levels. Otherwise, they decrease their advertising levels. Note that only
the mentioned term is relevant because market entry does not affect the negative
effect of increasing advertising, namely losing viewers
∂(
∂Di
∂wi
w∗i p)
∂N = 0.
After market entry each channel has a lower number of viewers in the equilib-
rium. This has two effects on the incentives to offer advertising. We can distinguish
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between them by taking the derivative of D∗i
∂(w∗i p)
∂wi
with respect to N .
On the one hand, an increase in the advertising level, which yields a higher
revenue per viewer, has a smaller positive effect on the profit because it works on a
smaller number of viewers. This is reflected in the term
∂D∗i
∂N
∂(w∗i p)
∂wi
= − 1
N2
∂(w∗i p)
∂wi
< 0 (3.55)
and gives an incentive to decrease the advertising level.
On the other hand, the smaller audience size decreases the impact of channel i
on the price because a change in the advertising level leads to smaller change in the
total supply of viewer-time units. This is reflected in the term
D∗i
∂(∂(w
∗
i p)
∂wi
)
∂N
=
1
N
w∗i
1
N2
> 0 (3.56)
and gives an incentive to increase the advertising level.
Therefore, we see that a smaller audience size has two counteracting effects. The
total effect depends on the size of the different effects. The dimension of the first
effect decreases in the advertising level,12 and the dimension of the second effect in-
creases in the advertising level.13 Hence, if the advertising level w∗i is relatively high,
then the total effect is positive and market entry leads to an even higher advertising
level. We have already seen that a higher t leads to a higher w∗i (see Lemma 3.1).
Therefore, if the differentiation is relatively high, then the equilibrium value of the
advertising level is above the threshold value. Hence, the advertising level increases
if market entry occurs. One may wonder why t has to be higher if A increases
(tcrit = 2N
2A
2+N ) because w
∗
i increases if A increases. But a higher A has two effects.
A higher A leads to a higher w∗i but it increases the equilibrium value of p
∗, which
puts more weight on the first effect (see Equation 3.55).
To summarize, we see that the effect of market entry on the advertising level is
ambiguous. Given a high level of differentiation, the advertising level increases, and
12 dp
dwi
|w∗1=...=w∗N = − 1N ;
∂( ∂p∂wi
w∗i +p(w
∗
i ))
∂wi
= ∂(−
1
N w
∗
i +(A−w∗i ))
∂wi
< 0
13 ∂(− 1N w∗i +p)
∂N =
1
N2 w
∗
i ;
∂( 1
N2
w∗i )
∂wi
> 0
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given a low level of differentiation, it decreases.
In a next step we consider how market entry affects the profits of the broadcasting
channels. There exists an advertising level ŵ = A2 that maximizes the revenue per
viewer
∂[(A− wi)wi]
∂wi
= A− 2wi = 0; (3.57)
ŵi =
1
2
A. (3.58)
If the broadcasting channels colluded, then they would choose this advertising
level. In the following we have to distinguish between four situations.
Situation 1. ŵi < w∗i and
∂w∗i
∂N > 0 → ∂π∂N < 0
In this situation the equilibrium advertising level is higher than the advertis-
ing level that maximizes the profits per viewer. Furthermore, the differentiation
parameter t is above the threshold level t > 2N
2A
2+N . Hence, market entry increases
the equilibrium advertising (see Proposition 3.4). It is obvious that the profits of
the channels decrease. Firstly, given market entry, a channel has less viewers in
equilibrium because 1N decreases in N . Secondly, the equilibrium advertising level
increases, which yields a smaller revenue per viewer.
Situation 2. ŵi > w∗i and
∂w∗i
∂N < 0 → ∂π∂N < 0
In this second situation the equilibrium advertising level is lower than the adver-
tising level that maximizes the revenue per viewer. Furthermore, the differentiation
parameter t is smaller than the threshold level. Hence, given market entry, the
equilibrium advertising decreases. Therefore, it is obvious that the profit of an in-
cumbent decrease with market entry.
Situation 3. ŵi < w∗i and
∂w∗i
∂N < 0 → ∂π∂N Q 0
In this third situation the equilibrium advertising level is higher than the level
that maximizes the revenue per viewer. Furthermore, given market entry, the equi-
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librium level of advertising decreases. Hence, the revenue per viewer increases, which
has a positive effect on the profit of an incumbent. At the same time the incumbent
loses viewers, which has a negative impact on the profit. To summarize, there are
two counteracting effects on an incumbent’s profit. Whether the profit decreases or
increases depends on the size of the different effects.
πi = (A− w∗i )w∗i
1
N
(3.59)
∂πi
∂N
= − 1
N2
(A− w∗i )w∗i +
1
N
∂w∗i
∂N
(A− 2w∗i ) Q 0 with ŵi < w∗i and
∂w∗i
∂N
< 0(3.60)
Let us illustrate this case with a numerical example. We assume that A = 10
and t = 300. The first derivative of a channel’s profit function with respect to N is
zero at the values N1 ≈ 25. 597 and N2 ≈ 40. 838. Therefore, we have two extrema.
Checking the second order condition yields
∂2πi
∂N2
= 0.002224 > 0 with N1 = 25. 597;
∂2πi
∂N2
= −0.0010858 < 0 with N2 = 40. 838.
Hence, the profit of a channel is increasing in N for N ∈]N1; N2[. Figure 3.2
shows a channel’s advertising level and a channel’s profit for the numerical example.
We see that the profit starts to decrease in N , then it increases in N , and if N > 41,
then it decreases again.
Situation 4. ŵi > w∗i and
∂w∗i
∂N > 0
Theoretically, this situation may be possible. It could be that the equilibrium
advertising level is too low and that market entry leads to a higher equilibrium ad-
vertising level. Nevertheless, we can exclude this case with our chosen functions.
Given that the differentiation parameter t is above the threshold level, the advertis-
ing level is always higher than ŵi with N > 2.
To show this we calculate the smallest possible w∗i given t ≥ 2N
2A
2+N and compare
it to ŵ
w∗i (t =
2N2A
2 + N
) =
NA
2 + N
>
A
2
∀N > 2. (3.61)
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Figure 3.2: Advertising level and profit
We summarize our findings in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5 Market entry decreases the profits of the incumbents
• if the differentiation is relatively high(t > 2N2A2+N ). The equilibrium advertis-
ing level is above the revenue maximizing advertising level and market entry
increases the equilibrium advertising level.
• if the differentiation is relatively low (t < N2A2N−2). The equilibrium advertis-
ing level is below the revenue maximizing advertising level and market entry
decreases the equilibrium advertising level.
If the differentiation parameter has a medium value (2N
2A
2+N > t >
N2A
2N−2), then
the equilibrium advertising level is above the revenue maximizing advertising level.
Furthermore, market entry leads to a lower equilibrium advertising level. In this
case it might occur that the incumbents’ profits increase with market entry.
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Proof.
We know that ŵi = A2 . Looking for t s.t. w
∗
i =
A
2 yields
t =
N2A
2N − 2 (3.62)
For the rest see above.
The surprising finding that market entry can lead to higher profits comes from
the two externalities that are incorporated in our model. Given the pecuniary exter-
nality, a platform does not internalize that it decreases the other platforms’ profits if
he increases the supply of viewer-time units. This goes in the direction of a too high
advertising level compared to the collusive advertising level. Hence, the platforms
would like to commit to a lower advertising level. Therefore, individually rational
behavior leads to a too high advertising level compared to collectively rational be-
havior.
On the other hand, we have the participation externality. Given this externality,
a platform does not internalize that it increases the profits of the competing plat-
forms if he chooses a higher advertising level. This goes in the direction of a too low
advertising level. Hence, the platforms would like to commit to a higher advertising
level. Therefore, individually rational behavior leads to a too low advertising level
compared to collectively rational behavior.
To illustrate this point, consider the example of two channels and the parameter
values A = 100 and t = 200. Although we have competition, the equilibrium adver-
tising level w∗i = 50 equals the collusive advertising level ŵi = 50. We see that the
”suboptimal” behavior of the firms on one side of the market, from a collusive point
of view, corrects the ”suboptimal” behavior on the other side of the market.14
14Reisinger (2004) shows a related effect of the interaction between the two markets. In his paper he
considers a situation where two platforms compete in prices and the advertisers total demand is fixed.
Suppose that the differentiation parameter is very high. Hence, viewers never switch between the platforms.
Competition between the channels yields an advertising price of zero. In such a situation Reisinger (2004)
shows that an exogenous decrease of the differentiation parameter increases the profits. The intuition is that
viewers begin to switch. Therefore, the channels have to take care of their advertising levels. This leads to
higher prices for advertising, which yields a higher profit per channel.
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In the following we consider the impact of market entry on social welfare. A
social planer, who wants to determine the optimal advertising level w̃, has to solve
the following trade-off. On the one hand, a higher advertising level increases the
surplus of the advertisers. On the other hand, a higher advertising level decreases
the surplus of the viewers. One can easily determine the optimal advertising level
that solves this trade-off. The willingness to pay of the advertisers (p) should be
equal to the marginal change in the viewers’ utility (= 1).
1 = A− w̃ (3.63)
w̃ = A− 1 (3.64)
One can compute the necessary relationship between t, A and N such that the
equilibrium advertising level is equal to the social optimal advertising level w̃i
w̃i =
Nt + t + N2A−
√
(Nt + t + N2A)2 − 4N3tA
2N2
= A− 1; (3.65)
t = N2
A− 1
N + 1−A. (3.66)
Concerning the effects of market entry on the social welfare, we have to take
into account the reduction of the consumers’ transportation costs. Hence, the social
welfare function is
WF = (A− w)w + 1
2
w2 − t
4N
− w. (3.67)
In order to consider whether market entry leads to a higher or lower welfare, we
have again to distinguish between four situations:
Situation 1: w∗i > w̃i and
∂w∗i
∂N < 0 → ∂WF∂N > 0
In this first case the differentiation parameter t is between 2N
2A
2+N > t > N
2 A−1
N+1−A .
Hence, the advertising level is too high from a welfare point of view. Market entry
leads to a lower advertising level because the transportation costs are below the
CHAPTER 3. TWO-SIDED MARKETS 68
threshold level. In this case market entry unambiguously increases welfare. The ad-
vertising level moves in the right direction and the consumers’ transportation costs
decrease. Given that the differentiation parameter t can be in the mentioned area,
the parameter A has to be A > 1 + N2 .
15
Situation 2: w∗ < w̃ and ∂w
∗
∂N > 0 → ∂WF∂N > 0
As in case 1, in this second case market entry increases the social welfare. If
A > 1+ N2 then t can be between N
2 A−1
N+1−A > t >
2N2A
2+N . Hence, the advertising level
is below the social optimal advertising level. Market entry increases the advertising
level. Furthermore, the viewers’ transportation costs decrease if market entry occurs.
Situation 3: w∗ > w̃ and ∂w
∗
∂N > 0 → ∂WF∂N Q 0
If t is very high (t > max{N2 A−1N+1−A , 2N
2A
2+N }), then the equilibrium advertising
level is above the social optimal level. Market entry yields two counteracting effects.
On the one hand, the consumers’ transportation costs are reduced. On the other
hand, the advertising level moves in the ”wrong” direction. Nevertheless, numeri-
cal examples let us expect that the positive effect on social welfare always dominates.
Situation 4: w∗ < w̃ and ∂w
∗
∂N < 0 → ∂WF∂N Q 0
If the differentiation parameter t is very low (t < min{N2 A−1N+1−A , 2N
2A
2+N }), then
the advertising level is above the social optimal level. Market entry decreases the ad-
vertising level even further. Even if the consumers’ transportation costs are reduced,
it can happen that the social welfare decreases with market entry. In particular this
is true when N goes to infinity and A above the critical value 54 . Given a high N
and further market entry, the decrease of the transportation costs is negligibly and
the negative effect of a lower advertising level dominates. Therefore, we conclude
that perfect competition has not to be desirable from a welfare point of view.
Proposition 3.6 The equilibrium advertising level can be above or below the social
optimal advertising level. Therefore, market entry has two welfare effects. On the
one hand, it changes the equilibrium advertising level. This can increase or decrease
social welfare. On the other hand, it decreases the transportation costs of the view-
15 2N2A
2+N > N
2 A−1
N+1−A → A > 1 + N2
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ers, which unambiguously increases welfare. In particular if A > 54 , then perfect
competition does not maximize social welfare.
Proof. See Appendix.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have analyzed a two-sided market model where broadcasting chan-
nels offer a costless program to viewers. The channels make profits by selling viewer-
time units to advertisers. In contrast to the existing literature, we have combined
the ”participation externality” (more advertisements on platform i decrease its own
audience size and increase the other platforms’ audience sizes) and the ”pecuniary
externality” (more advertisements on platform i changes the advertisers’ willingness
to pay on all platforms). We have given two examples: the ”Code of Conduct” of
the National Association of Broadcasters in the US and the discussion about ad-
vertising on public broadcasting channels in Germany. Both examples illustrate the
existence of pecuniary externalities. We have provided two microfoundations for pe-
cuniary externalities, namely a convex cost function and word-of-mouth advertising.
We have shown that advertising can have the property of a strategic substitute or
complement. Furthermore, market entry can increase or decrease the equilibrium
advertising level. Both is in contrast to the existing literature. Moreover, we have
shown that market entry can make incumbents better off and that perfect competi-
tion does not have to be desirable from a welfare point of view.
Given the introduction of Digital Television, our model leads to the policy im-
plication that governments should be careful with additional broadcasting licenses.
In particular they should take into account that the equilibrium advertising level
can move in the wrong direction and that this can decrease welfare. Furthermore,
our model shows that advertising ceilings, which restrict the time that a channel
can offer to advertisers, can be used as a collusive device between the broadcasting
channels in order to increase the price for advertising. This function of advertising
ceilings does not appear in the existing literature. Therefore, we conclude that a
government should be careful with such advertising ceilings, particularly if the chan-
nels ask for such ceilings in order to protect viewer against ”too much” advertising.
Natural extensions of this model would be to consider the program quality choices
of the broadcasters and to consider the introduction of subscription fees. In partic-
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ular the last point seems quite interesting. The existing literature, like Peitz and
Valetti (2004), only considers subscription fees in the Anderson and Coate (2005)
framework, so without pecuniary externalities. It would be interesting to analyze
subscription fees under perfect competition in a model that includes pecuniary exter-
nalities. Without pecuniary externalities, channels set monopoly advertising levels
and compensate the viewers by a corresponding lower subscription price. Hence,
an inefficiency arises due to the monopoly advertising level, which is persistent even
under perfect competition. Given pecuniary externalities, perfect competition would
drive the advertising level to the social optimal level. Therefore, with two instru-
ments, advertising prices and subscription prices, and two externalities, pecuniary
and participation externalities, more competition would always increase social wel-
fare. Hence, perfect competition would be unambiguously desirable from a welfare
point of view.
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3.8 Appendix
Switching Viewers
We consider ”switching viewers” in order to derive pecuniary externalities. As in
Anderson and Coate (2005), we consider two periods (say day 1 and day 2) where
the channels broadcast their programs and viewers watch these programs. Assume
furthermore that the channels have to commit to their advertising levels for the two
periods in advance. Additionally, we make the assumption that the viewers reallo-
cate after the day 1 on the Salop circle at random. A possible explanation is that the
kind of differentiation of the channels is different. For an illustration assume that
channel A broadcasts always US movies and channel B broadcasts always French
movies. If a viewer decides to watch the US movie, then this has not to imply that
this viewer always watches this channel. Perhaps he has chosen the US movie be-
cause it was a black and white movie and next time the French movie is black and
white. Or he preferred the US movie because it was a love story and next time the
French channel has the better love story to offer.
Let us look at a representative advertiser g. If he advertises wgi1 on channel i in
the first period, then the viewers of this channel buy his product with a probability of
z = z(wgi1). We assume that the probability function z is concave in the advertising
level
z′ > 0, z′′ < 0 with z(0) = 0, z(∞) = 1 .
This assumption ensures that the second order condition of the advertisers are
globally satisfied. We stick to the assumption that each consumer is only interested
in one unit of a certain product. This implies that all viewers who have bought a
product in the first period will for sure not buy such a product in the second period.
Hence, only a non-buyer of the first period can get informed about the product of
advertiser g in the second period. In this second period the probability z depends
again on the length of the advertising spot.
This leads to the following expected profit function for advertiser g:
πg = v[
N∑
j=1
Dj1(z(wgj1)+(1−z(wgj1))
N∑
i=1
Di2z(wgi2)]−
N∑
j=1
pj1wgj1Dj1−
N∑
i=1
pi2wgi2Di2 .
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Maximizing with respect to the optimal advertising level on channel k in both
periods leads to
pk1 = v[1−
N∑
i=1
Di2z(wgi2)]z′(wgk1)
pk2 = v[1−
N∑
j=1
Dj1z(wgj1)]z′(wgk2)
For simplicity let us assume, as Anderson and Coate (2005), that every channel
offers the same time for commercials in both periods.16 This implies that given wi,
a channel i has the audience size Di in both periods. In particular the channel k
gets the same per viewer-time unit time price pk in both periods. This price pk is
pk = pk1 = pk2 = v[1−
N∑
j=1
Djz(wgj)]z′(wgk).
If another channel l changes its advertising level in such a way that firm g
advertises more on this channel, then it distorts the price pk
∂pk
∂wgl
= −vDlz′(wgl)z′(wgk) < 0 .
Thus, the broadcasting channels have pecuniary externalities. The intuition for
this is straightforward: if an advertiser advertises more on channel l in both periods,
then this leads to a decrease in the effectiveness of advertising on channel k. The
reason is simply that the probability to get a non-buyer gets smaller (through the
higher advertising level on channel l) and therefore the net payoff from advertising
decreases.
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Symmetry and the knowledge Di = 1N yields:
∂πi
∂wi
= −1
t
wi[A−Nwi 1
N
] +
1
N
[A−Nwi 1
N
]− 1
N2
wi = 0
16Given the assumption, the channels have pecuniary externalities on each other in both periods. If we
allow for different advertising levels in the two periods, then we derive intertemporal externalities in the
sense that the advertising level of channel l in one period influences the willingness to pay of the advertiser
in the other period. Such a dynamic analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. But we expect that such a
dynamic model yields qualitatively the same results.
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∂πi
∂wi
= −1
t
wiA +
1
t
w2i +
1
N
A− 1
N
wi − 1
N2
wi = 0
∂πA
∂wA
= −N2wiA + N2w2i + NtA−Ntwi − twi = 0
∂πA
∂wA
= N2w2i + [−Nt− t−N2A]wi + NtA = 0
wi1,2 =
(Nt + t + N2A)±
√
(Nt + t + N2A)2 − 4N3tA
2N2
Checking the second-order condition:
∂2πi
∂w2i
=
∂2Di
∂w2i
wip + 2
∂Di
∂wi
p + 2
∂Di
∂wi
wi
dp
dwi
+ 2D
dp
dwi
+ 2Diwi
d2p
dw2i
< 0.
Evaluating at a symmetric equilibrium yields:
−1
t
p∗ + 2
1
t
w∗i
1
N
− 1
N2
< 0
p > 2w∗i
1
N
− t
N2
A− w∗i > 2w∗i
1
N
− t
N2
wi <
t + AN2
N2 + 2N
Now plugging in
w∗i =
(Nt + t + N2A)−
√
(Nt + t + N2A)2 − 4N3tA
2N2
This gives
(Nt + t + N2A)−
√
(Nt + t + N2A)2 − 4N3tA
2N2
<
t + AN2
N2 + 2N
(Nt + t + N2A)−
√
(Nt + t + N2A)2 − 4N3tA
2N2
− t + AN
2
N2 + 2N
< 0
N2t + Nt + 2t−N3A + 2N2A− (N + 2)
√
(Nt + t + N2A)2 − 4N3tA < 0
Case 1: If N2t + Nt + 2t−N3A + 2N2A ≤ 0, then SOC is fulfilled.
Case 2: If N2t + Nt + 2t−N3A + 2N2A > 0, then we have to show that
N2t+Nt+2t−N3A+2N2A < (N+2)
√
(N2t2 + 2Nt2 − 2N3tA + t2 + 2tN2A + N4A2)
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(N2t+Nt+2t−N3A+2N2A)2 < (N+2)2 (N2t2 + 2Nt2 − 2N3tA + t2 + 2tN2A + N4A2)
−8N2t2 − 8Nt2 − 8N5A2 − 4N3t2 + 8N4tA < 0
2Nt2 + 2t2 + 2N4A2 + N2t2 − 2N3tA > 0
We know that the term 2Nt2 + 2t2 + 2N4A2 + N2t2 − 2N3tA is always positive
or negative because the Determinant with respect to t and A is negative. We see
immediately that the term is positive for N = 1 (2t2 + 2t2 + 2A2 + t2 − 2tA =
4t2 + A2 + (A − t)2 > 0). Furthermore, we can show that the term 2Nt2 + 2t2 +
2N4A2 + N2t2 − 2N3tA is increasing in N . Therefore it is positive for all N > 1.
∂(2Nt2 + 2t2 + 2N4A2 + N2t2 − 2N3tA)
∂N
= 2t2 + 8N3A2 + 2Nt2 − 6tN2A > 0
8N3A2 + 2Nt2 − 6tN2A > 0
4N3A2 + Nt2 − 3tN2A > 0
4N2A2 + t2 − 3tNA > 0
(2NA− t)2 + NAt > 0
Now showing that
w =
(Nt + t + N2A) +
√
(Nt + t + N2A)2 − 4N3tA
2N2
is a minimum.
Plugging into
w∗i <
t + AN2
N2 + 2N
yields
N2t + Nt + 2t−N3A + 2N2A + (N + 2)
√
(Nt + t + N2A)2 − 4N3tA > 0
Case 1: If N2t + Nt + 2t−N3A + 2N2A > 0, then SOC is not fulfilled.
Case 2: If N2t + Nt + 2t−N3A + 2N2A ≤ 0, then we have to show
(N2t + Nt + 2t−N3A + 2N2A)2 < (N + 2)2((Nt + t + N2A)2 − 4N3tA).
We know that this is true. See proof of maximum.
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Proof of Proposition 3.2
For Case 2:
∂πi
dwi
|wi=w−i− t2 =
1
2t
(−7w−it + 3t2 + 2w2−i + 3At− 2Aw−i
)
= 0
→ w−i = 74 t +
1
2
A± 1
4
√
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2)
Hence, if player i plays wi = w−i − t2 , then the FOC has two nulls. We can exclude
the point w−i = 74 t +
1
2A +
1
4
√
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2) because
w−i =
7
4
t +
1
2
A +
1
4
√
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2) > wH−i =
A
2
− t
2
and therefore it falls in the range of Case 1.
Now we check if wi = 74 t +
1
2A − 14
√
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2) − t2 is indeed a maximum
given w−i = 74 t +
1
2A − 14
√
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2). Checking the SOC at the value
wi = 74 t+
1
2A−14
√
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2)− t2 and w−i = 74 t+12A−14
√
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2)
yields
∂2πi
∂w2i
=
1
4t
(
6A + 23t− 7
√
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2)
)
.
To show 14t
(
6A + 23t− 7
√
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2)
)
< 0. Simplifying yields
−160A2 + 80At− 696t2 < −(1
2
A)2 + At− t2 = −(1
2
A− t)2 < 0
Now more generally: Given the nulls at w−i = 74 t+
1
2A± 14
√
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2) for
wi = w−i − t2 and the fact that the SOC is negative at the point wi = w−i − t2 with
w−i = 74 t +
1
2A − 14
√
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2) we have that the FOC is negative for all
wi = w−i − t2 with
w−i ∈]74 t +
1
2
A− 1
4
√
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2);
7
4
t +
1
2
A +
1
4
√
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2)[
. Therefore, it would payoff to decrease wi. But we are at a kink of the profit
function. Hence, wi = w−i − t2 is indeed a maximum. Further decreasing wi does
not change the audience size (it is Di = 1), but reduces the revenue per viewer.
Next, we show that
7
4
t +
1
2
A− 1
4
√
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2) <
A
2
+
t
2
7
4
t +
A
2
− 1
4
√
25t2 + 4At + 4A2 − (A
2
+
t
2
) < 0
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5
4
t− 1
4
√
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2) < 0
5
4
t <
1
4
√
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2)
This is true for all t > 0 and A > 0.
For Case 3:
We have to show that the value wCase3i is indeed an optimum. Therefore, we
show that for all values of wi s.t. w−i− t2 ≤ wi ≤ w−i + t2 the second order condition
is fulfilled given that w−i < 74 t +
1
2A− 14
√
(25t2 + 4At + 4A2).
∂2πi
∂w2i
= −1
2
4At− 12wit + 24w2i − 36wiw−i + 4w−it + 12w2−i + t2
t2
Given wi = wi + x with − t2 ≤ x ≤ t2 , ∂
2πi
∂w2i
< 0 if
4At− 8w−it− 12tx + 12w−ix + 24x2 + t2 > 0
This term is decreasing in wi due to − t2 ≤ x ≤ t2 . The term is zero if
wzero−i =
4At− 12tx + 24x2 + t2
8t− 12x
Hence, it is sufficient to show that wzero−i > w
C
−i
wzero−i >
4At− 12t ∗ 0 + 24 ∗ 02 + t2
8t− 12(− t2)
> wC−i
2
7
A +
1
14
t >
7
4
t +
1
2
A−
√
25t2 + 4At + 4A2
3
14
A +
47
28
t <
√
25t2 + 4At + 4A2
9
196
A2 +
141
196
At +
2209
784
t2 − (25t2 + 4At + 4A2) = −775
196
A2 − 643
196
At− 17391
784
t2 < 0
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Proof of Proposition 3.3
With wA = wB = wi it follows:
∂2π
∂wA∂wB
=
A− wi
t
− 1
4
− wi
t
Strategic substitutes:
w∗i =
3
8
t +
1
2
A− 1
8
√
9t2 − 8At + 16A2 i ∈ {A,B}
∂2π
∂wA∂wB
= −1 + 1
4t
√
(9t2 − 8At + 16A2) < 0
1
4t
√
(9t2 − 8At + 16A2) < 1
1
16t2
(
9t2 − 8At + 16A2) < 1
9t2 − 8At + 16A2 < 16t2
−7t2 − 8At + 16A2 < 0
d(−7t2 − 8At + 16A2)
dt
= −14t− 8A < 0
−7t2 − 8At + 16A2 = 0
t1 = −47A−
8
7
√
2A < 0
t2 = −47A +
8
7
√
2A > 0
Therefore given A, the function is positive for all t ∈]t1; t2[. Hence, we have strategic
substitutes if
t > −4
7
A +
8
7
√
2A =
4
7
A(2
√
2− 1)
Otherwise we have strategic complements.
Proof of Lemma 3.1
We show ∂w
∗
i
∂t > 0 by using the implicit function theorem.
d
∂πi
∂wi
|w∗1=...=w∗N =
∂ ∂πi∂wi
∂t
dt +
∂2πi
∂w2i
dwi = 0
dw∗i
dt
= −pw
∗
i
∂Di
∂wi∂t
[SOC]
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dw∗i
dt
= − pw
∗
i
1
t2
[SOC]
> 0
We show ∂w
∗
i
∂A > 0 by using the implicit function theorem.
d
∂πi
∂wi
|w∗1=...=w∗N =
∂ ∂πi∂wi
∂A
d + A
∂2πi
∂w2i
dwi = 0
dw∗i
dA
= −pw
∗
i
∂Di
∂wi∂A
[SOC]
dw∗i
dA
= −−
1
t
∂p
∂Aw
∗
i +
1
N
∂p
∂A
[SOC]
dw∗i
dA
= −
∂p
∂A
∂(Diwi)
∂wi
[SOC]
> 0
because
∂πi
∂wi
|w∗1=...=w∗N =
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
p
∂(Diwi)
∂wi
+
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂p
∂wi
Diwi= 0
Proof of Proposition 3.4
The first order condition at a symmetric equilibrium w∗1 = ... = w
∗
N is
∂πi
∂wi
= −1
t
pw∗i +
1
N
∂(w∗i p)
∂wi
= 0
By totally differentiating this first order condition we get
[SOC]dwi + [−1
t
∂(w∗i p)
∂N
− 1
N2
∂(w∗i p)
∂wi
+
1
N
∂
∂(pw∗i )
∂wi
∂N
]dN = 0
[SOC]dwi + [− 1
N2
∂(w∗i p)
∂wi
+
1
N
∂
∂(pw∗i )
∂wi
∂N
]dN = 0
∂w∗i (N)
∂N
= −−
1
N2
∂(w∗i p)
∂wi
+ 1N
∂
∂(pw∗i )
∂wi
∂N
[SOC]
Therefore, ∂w
∗
i (N)
∂N > 0 if
− 1
N2
∂(w∗i p)
∂wi
+
1
N
∂
∂(pw∗i )
∂wi
∂N
> 0
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∂
∂(pw∗i )
∂wi
∂N
>
1
N
∂(w∗i p)
∂wi
∂(p− 1N w∗i )
∂N
>
1
N
(p− 1
N
w∗i )
1
N2
w∗i >
1
N
(p− 1
N
w∗i )
2
N
w∗i > p
2
N
w∗i > (A− w∗)
w∗i >
AN
2 + N
Plugging in w∗i , one sees that this is the case if t >
2N2A
2+N
Proof of Proposition 3.6
It remains to show:
lim
N→∞
(
∂WF
∂N
=
∂w∗i
∂N
(A− w∗i − 1) +
t
4N2
≤ 0)
Using the Implicit Function Theorem we know that
∂w∗i
∂N
= −
1
N2
(N+2N w
∗
i −A)
−At + N+2Nt w∗i − 1N2
This leads to
∂WF
∂N
= −
1
N2
(N+2N w
∗
i −A)
−At + N+2Nt w∗i − 1N2
(A− w∗i − 1) +
t
4N2
lim
N→∞
1
N2
{ −(
N+2
N w
∗
i −A)
−At + N+2Nt w∗i − 1N2
(A− w∗i − 1)−
t
4
} = 0
due to
lim
N→∞
w∗i =
( tN +
t
N2
+ A)−
√
(Nt+t+N2A)2−4N3tA
N2
2
= 0
Now to show that we approach zero from below with A > 54
lim
N→∞
{ −(
N+2
N w
∗
i −A)
−At + N+2Nt w∗i − 1N2
(A− w∗i − 1)−
t
4
} < 0
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A
−At
(A− 1) + t
4
< 0
A >
5
4
Chapter 4
Patent Settlements and Market
Entry∗
4.1 Introduction
Licensing of intellectual property rights is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it
can be procompetitive and welfare enhancing. Firms are able to allocate property
rights efficiently and this increases social welfare. Furthermore, licensing can be
an efficient way to settle patent disputes out of court because the licensor and the
licensee can avoid uncertainty and litigation costs. Moreover, courts are strongly
favoring settlements because these conserve public administrative and judical re-
sources.1
On the other hand, some licensing arrangements may raise antitrust concerns
by reducing competition. This is widely recognized and, for example, the FTC’s
Guidelines for Intellectual Property Rights state:
”Antitrust concerns may arise when a licensing arrangement harms competition
among entities that would have been actual or likely potential competitors in a rele-
vant market in the absence of a license (entities in a ”horizontal relationship”). A
restraint in a licensing arrangement may harm such competition, for example, if it
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Jing-Yuan Chiou, University of Toulouse.
1O’Roureke and Brodley (2003), Shapiro (2003).
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facilitates market division or price fixing.”2
In this chapter we discuss the needed antitrust limits to patent settlements. In
particular we analyze the implications of these antitrust limits with endogenous
market entry, which has not been considered in the literature so far. The basic idea
of the model is that a potential entrant, who has to incur fixed costs for entering
the market, anticipates the payoff from a potential settlement for his entry decision.
This payoff depends on the kind of settlement the parties are allowed to agree upon
and hence on the antitrust limits to such patent settlements. From a social point
of view, this raises the question what is the appropriate antitrust limit to patent
settlements? On the one hand, the parties should be able to enjoy high enough
profits by settling their dispute in order to prevent inefficient court decisions. This
goes in the direction of low antitrust limits. On the other hand, the limit should
not be too low because this may lead to inefficient market entry without increasing
consumer surplus in the appropriate way.
In order to analyze different antitrust limits with endogenous market entry, we
build a model with a patentholder already active in the market and an entrant who
has to decide whether to enter the market or not. The entrant has to incur fixed
costs for entering the market. If the entrant enters, then he infringes the patent of
the patentholder with a certain probability. We assume that the parties can solve
such a patent dispute through a court decision or by settling it out of court. The
possible profits from a settlement depend on the different kinds of antitrust limits,
which we will consider.
We find that, from a social point of view, having no limits to patent settlements
is not desirable at all because firms use such settlements to split up monopoly prof-
its and entry costs occur additionally. Shapiro (2003) proposes a limit that leaves
consumers equally well off and increases the profits of the firms compared to a law-
suit. We show that even such an antitrust limit may generate the wrong incentives
to enter the market and hence may decrease social welfare. Interestingly, we find
that a very restrictive antitrust limit can be optimal from a social point of view.
Furthermore, such a restrictive limit can maximize the profits of the patentholder.
Hence, we show that maximizing R&D incentives and having restrictive antitrust
limits can go hand in hand and do not have to work against each other.
2FTC (2002)
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Several authors stress the tension between intellectual property rights and an-
titrust.3 Maurer and Scotchmer (2006) suggest three unifying principles for accept-
able terms on licensing. Firstly, ”Profit Neutrality” implies that the possible reward
of a patent should not depend on the pantentee’s ability to work the patent himself.
Secondly, ”Derived Reward” holds that the patentholder’s profit should be earned
from the social value created by the invention. Thirdly, ”Minimalism” holds that li-
censing contracts should not contain more restrictions than are necessary to achieve
neutrality. However, if it is not obvious whether a party infringes a valid patent
or not, a problem arises with the principal ”derived reward”. In this case it is not
obvious what the appropriate reward should be.
To illustrate this point, consider the following example. Suppose that firm A
produces one good and that firm B produces one good. Both goods are different,
but they have some similar or related parts. These two goods are substitutes for the
consumers. We assume that no other substitute exists. Both firms compete against
each other. Now suppose that firm A receives a patent that protects a certain feature
of his product. It is not clear to both parties whether firm B infringes A’s patent.
Firstly, it is not obvious that A’s patent is indeed valid because of possible prior art
that is yet unknown to them. Secondly, it is not obvious that A’s patent covers B’s
product. For simplicity, let us assume that both parties agree that with probability
α the patent is indeed valid and B’s product infringes A’s patent.
Suppose that the firms decide to merge in order to solve the patent dispute or
that they write a settlement contract that replicates the merger outcome.4 This
merger, or the corresponding settlement, will certainly not be accepted by the an-
titrust authorities if no patent is involved. This raises the question: Should such
a merger or settlement contract be possible only because there is an ”uncertain”
patent infringement involved?
Applying the mentioned principle ”derived reward” raises the question concern-
ing the right patent’s reward that the society should grant. The answer to this ques-
tion is not obvious. Given that B is indeed infringing A’s valid patent, monopoly
profits are justifiable and a merger or the corresponding settlement would be per-
fectly fine. In contrast, given B does not infringe or given A’s patent is not valid,
3among others: Choi (2005), Farell and Shapiro (2005), Hovenkamp, Janis and Lemley (2003), Lemely
and Shapiro (2005), Maurer and Scotchmer (2006), O’Rourke and Brodley (2003), Shapiro (2003)
4Shapiro (1985),(2003) discusses several possible contracts. See also Maurer and Scotchmer(2006).
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these actions should be illegal. Hence, one possibility would be to let a court decide
whether A has indeed a valid patent and B is indeed infringing A’s patent to clarify
the situation.
But such a court decision is completely inefficient from a welfare point of view.
Firms have to pay lawyers and some of their internal resources are bounded because
managers have to take care of the lawsuit. Furthermore, the society has to afford a
big enough court system in order to handle all these cases. In addition, the welfare
function is usually concave in the price. Hence, the society is ”risk-averse” (Shapiro
(2003), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990)). Therefore, welfare is higher under the certain
price p̂ = αpm + (1−α)pc than under the price pm with probability α and the price
pc with probability 1 − α. A court decision is a kind of lottery because either the
patentholder wins and there is a monopoly price pm, or the entrant wins and there
is a duopoly price pc. Hence, a settlement that leads to a price that is between
the monopoly and duopoly price can be preferable to a court decision by avoiding
uncertainty.
Meurer (1989) considers, as we do, settlements between a patentee and a com-
petitor under different antitrust limits. Nevertheless, his work differs from ours in
two respects. Firstly, he assumes that the competitor is already in the market, or
equivalently that the entry costs are zero, whereas we look explicitly at the entry
decision in the presence of entry costs. Secondly, he gives the patentee the whole
bargaining power. Therefore, the competitor gets his outside option. In contrast,
we assume a symmetric Nash-bargaining, which leaves room for strategic actions of
the potential entrant.
Shapiro (2003) introduces a new idea concerning antitrust limits to patent set-
tlements. He sets up the rule that ”the proposed settlement generates at least as
much surplus for consumers as they would have enjoyed had the settlement not
been reached and the dispute instead been resolved through litigation”.5 Shapiro
(2003) argues that this rule fully respects the patentholder’s rights because he gets
at least the same payoff as without a settlement. Furthermore, his rule would lead
to efficient settlements and therefore would increase social welfare. Shapiro (2003)
states that the observed enforcement actions of the DOJ and FTC are consistent
with his rule. For example, in the case of Schering-Plough, the FTC compared the
amount of competition that occurred under the considered settlement to the amount
5Shapiro (2003)
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of competition that was likely to occur in the absence of such a settlement. In this
particular case the FTC concluded that the settlement unreasonably restrained com-
merce.6 However, Shapiro (2003) does not consider market entry. By extending his
framework, we evaluate the Shapiro policy, beside other antitrust limits, under en-
dogenous market entry.
Choi (2005) considers the Shapiro policy with cross-licensing. Instead of con-
sidering market entry, he asks whether the parties obtain the right incentives to
litigate under the Shapiro policy. Considering cross-licensing, he shows that the
parties may have no incentive to sue each other, which leaves the society worse off.
Therefore, the Shapiro policy generates the wrong litigation incentives for firms that
have entered the market. We do not consider cases of cross-licensing and so avoid
problems related to litigation incentives in order to fully concentrate on the prob-
lems concerning market entry.
Waterson (1990) considers the entry and location decision of a firm in the pres-
ence of a patent. In contrast to our work, he does not consider patent settlements
and hence does not deal with antitrust limits to licensing contracts.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section we set up the model. In
Section 3 we assume that the entrant has to incur the full entry costs before a court
decides whether the entrant is infringing a valid patent or not. In Section 4 we
consider the case where the entrant can resolve this uncertainty before he incurs the
full entry costs. In Section 5 we allow the parties to avoid sinking the entry costs
by settling out of court. Section 6 links our findings to the actual debate about the
patent system and Section 7 concludes.
4.2 Model
We assume that there are two firms: the patentholder P and a potential entrant E.
The patentholder is already operating in the market. The potential entrant E has to
incur an entry cost f to enter. P can sue E for patent infringement, or equivalently,
E can challenge P ’s patent. We denote by α the probability that the court finds
that E infringes P ’s valid patent.
6Schering-Plough I, 2003, WL 22989651
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We denote by πm monopoly profits in the market. If E does not enter the market
or if a court rules in the patentee’s favor, P is a monopolist and his profit is πm.
In this case consumer surplus is denoted by CSm and social welfare is denoted by
Wm = CSm + πm.
By πc we denote each firm’s profit with unconstrained competition between
them. If E enters and the court finds that he does not infringe a valid patent of P ,
then each firm’s profit is πc. Social welfare is in this case W c = CSc + 2πc − f . We
assume that πm ≥ 2πc ≥ 0, CSc ≥ CSm and CSc + 2πc > CSm + πm.
Firms can avoid court rulings by settling their patent infringement dispute. We
assume, as Shapiro (2003) and Choi (2005), zero litigation costs without loss of gen-
erality. Introducing litigation costs would only change the threshold values of entry
costs under which settlements or lawsuits occur, which leads to no new insights.
Beside avoiding litigation costs, settlements have two additional features on which
we would like to concentrate.
Firstly, a settlement avoids uncertainty. Absence of a settlement, a court deci-
sion solves a patent dispute. That court decision has two possible outcomes. Either
the patentholder wins and we have a monopoly, or the entrant wins and we have a
duopoly. With a concave welfare function, which we assume throughout the chap-
ter, the society is ”risk-avers”.7 Instead of having such a kind of lottery by a court
decision, a settlement leads to a certain price and hence generates an efficiency gain.
Secondly, the parties can use settlements to prevent competition that would have
arisen had the patentholder lost the lawsuit. Hence, even if the patent is very weak or
worthless, the parties can enjoy extraordinary profits by using settlement contracts
to sustain collusion. One can consider different possible designs of such settlements
like including price fixing, quantity restrictions, per-unit royalties, or territory agree-
ments. The parties can split up these collusive profits by appropriate side-payments.
We look at three different antitrust limits to patent settlements, which we intro-
duce in the following. As the most restrictive policy, we consider that firms are not
allowed to use a licensing contract to collude. Such an antitrust approach would de-
7For example a falling demand function and a weakly convex cost function lead to a concave welfare
function.
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clare contracts as illegal that include, for example, price fixing, quantity restrictions,
per-unit royalties, or territory agreements. Only fixed side payments are allowed.
Meurer (1989) calls this ”lump-sum policy”. Under such a lump-sum policy, the
firm’s profit is πc before the fixed side payment.
The ”laissez-faire policy” is the opposite to a lump-sum policy.8 All licensing
contracts are legal under such an antitrust limit. Given such a policy, the firms are
able to realize the highest possible joint profit πm. Afterwards they can use fixed
side payments to split up πm in the desired way.
Shapiro (2003) proposes a constrained settlement. He sets up a ”Shaprio policy”
to strike a balance between the lump-sum policy and the laissez- faire policy. This
Shapiro policy ensures that the consumers are always equally well off compared to
a lawsuit. In particular the consumer surplus after the settlement CSs has to be
equal to the expected consumer surplus of a court decision
CSs = αCSm + (1− α)CSc. (4.1)
Therefore, the firms are allowed to collude on a price ps in such a way that
CS(ps) = CSs. We denote by Πs the corresponding joint profits with ps. Due
to the concave welfare function, a settlement realizes an efficiency gain because it
avoids uncertainty. We denote by λ this efficiency gain. In particular we can define
λ in the following way
Πs − λ = απm + (1− α)2πc, (4.2)
because the firms are allowed to appropriate λ under the Shapiro policy. This is
the case because the consumers only have to be equal off.
Bargaining Scenarios
We assume Nash-Bargaining with equal bargaining power. For the patentholder’s
bargaining payoff and for the entrant’s bargaining payoff, it is important whether the
bargaining takes place before or after market entry. The entrant prefers an earlier
bargaining because this allows him to include his entry costs in the bargaining. In
contrast, the patentholder prefers a bargaining after the entrant has sunk his entry
8Meurer (1989)
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costs because this increases his payoff compared to an early bargaining. Therefore,
the entrant tries to achieve an early bargaining and the patentholder tries to have
a late bargaining. This raises the following question: When does the entrant has a
credible threat to go to court? As soon as the entrant has this credible threat, the
patentholder can no longer deny a bargaining.
According to the actual law situation in the US, the validity of a patent may be
challenged only by an ”alleged infringer as an affirmative defense or counterclaim to
an infringement action brought by the patentee, or by a declaratory judgment plain-
tiff, who must show (1) an explicit threat or other action by the pantentee which
creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory judgment plaintiff
that it will face an infringement suit, and (2) present activity by the declaratory
judgement plaintiff which could constitute infringement, or concrete steps taken by
the declaratory judgment plaintiff with the intend to conduct such activity”.9 Given
such a legal situation, the patentholder can force the entrant to wait with the bar-
gaining until the entrant has fully sunk his entry costs. Hence, in Scenario 1 we
consider a game where the entrant has to incur the full entry costs before a poten-
tial lawsuit or settlement takes place.
In contrast, in Europe everybody can challenge a patent without any restric-
tions. Hence, an entrant does not need not to incur the full entry costs in order to
challenge the patent. Therefore, in Scenario 2 we consider a game where the entrant
can challenge the patent whenever he wants. Nevertheless, the entrant has to incur
the entry costs after a settlement.
In Scenario 3 we assume that the parties can agree on a settlement in such a way
that the potential entrant stays off the market and receives a compensation payment
from the patentholder. Therefore, in this scenario the parties can avoid the entry
costs by a settlement. Such settlements, which include so called reverse payments,
have been quite often seen in the Pharmaceutical Industry.10
9Teva Pharma. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
10FTC (2002)
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4.3 Scenario 1: Bargaining after Entry Costs
are sunk
In Scenario 1 we assume that the bargaining or lawsuit takes place after the complete
entry costs have been sunk. The exact timing of the game is the following. Firstly,
E decides whether to enter the market or not. If he enters, then he has to incur the
entry costs f . Secondly, if E has entered, then the two firms E and P bargain for a
settlement or go to court. If E has not entered, then P remains monopolist. Figure
4.1 shows the structure of the game.
Figure 4.1: Scenario 1
In the following we determine the equilibrium under the different antitrust limits.
Lump-Sum Policy (LS)
Given that only fixed side payments are allowed, there is no scope for a bargaining
solution. The firms can only realize the profits 2πc ≤ απm + (1 − α)2πc by a
settlement, which is less than the sum of the outside options. Hence, the parties see
each other before court. The entrant anticipates that he has to complete the legal
process to survive in the market after incurring f . Market entry yields the following
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expected profit for the entrant
πE = α · 0 + (1− α)πc − f. (4.3)
Therefore, entry occurs if f ≤ (1− α)πc.
Finding 4.1: Assume that settlements have to obey the lump-sum policy and
that a potential lawsuit or bargaining takes place after market entry. If
• f ≤ (1− α)πc, then the entrant sinks f and a lawsuit occurs;
• f > (1− α)πc, then the entrant stays off the market.
Laissez-Faire Policy (LF)
The parties can split up monopoly profits πm under a laissez-faire policy. Therefore,
there is always scope for a bargaining solution
πm − απm − (1− α)2πc ≥ 0. (4.4)
The corresponding threat points are
TP = απm + (1− α)πc, for P , and
TE = (1− α)πc, for E. (4.5)
The entrant anticipates his payoff from a settlement. The corresponding en-
trant’s payoff if he enters is
πsE = (1− α)πc +
1
2
[πm − απm − (1− α)2πc]− f = 1
2
(1− α)πm − f. (4.6)
Hence, entry occurs if f is smaller than 12(1− α)πm.
Finding 4.2: Assume that settlements have to obey the laissez-faire policy and
that a potential lawsuit or bargaining takes place after market entry. If
• f ≤ 12(1− α)πm, then the entrant sinks f and a settlement occurs;
• f > 12(1− α)πm, then the entrant stays off the market.
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Shapiro Policy (SP)
Suppose that the antitrust authority approves every settlement that obeys the
Shapiro policy. Given the Shapiro policy, the firms have to respect the expected
consumer surplus from a lawsuit. Hence, the cooperative value of the bargaining is
Πs = απm + (1 − α)2πc + λ. We see that there is always scope for a bargaining
solution
απm + (1− α)2πc + λ− (απm + (1− α)2πc) = λ ≥ 0. (4.7)
This yields the following entrant’s profit from market entry
πsE = (1− α)πc +
1
2
[Πs − απm − (1− α)2πc]− f = 1
2
λ + πc(1− α)− f. (4.8)
Finding 4.3: Assume that settlements have to obey the Shapiro policy and that
a potential lawsuit or bargaining takes place after market entry. If
• f ≤ 12λ + πc(1− α), then the entrant sinks f and a settlement occurs;
• f > 12λ + πc(1− α), then the entrant stays off the market f .
Discussion
It is obvious that a laissez-faire policy generates the highest level of market entry
and an entrant prefers this antitrust limit to the other two. From the entrant’s point
of the view, the lump-sum policy is the worst case. Intuitively, the laissez-faire pol-
icy leads to the highest bargaining surplus and thus yields the highest profit for the
entrant. In contrast, the lump-sum policy minimizes the bargaining surplus and
therefore yields the lowest profit for the entrant.
A ranking of the different antitrust limits is not obvious for the patentholder.
For some values of f it depends on the antitrust limit whether the entrant enters
the market or not. Hence, the patentholder’s ranking depends on the actual value
of f . We summarize this in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1 Assume that a potential lawsuit or bargaining takes place after
market entry. The patentholder
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• prefers LF to SP to LS if
f < πc(1− α);
• prefers LS to LF to SP if
πc(1− α) ≤ f < 1
2
λ + πc(1− α);
• prefers LS and SP to LF and is indifferent between LS and SP if
1
2
λ + πc(1− α) ≤ f < 1
2
(1− α)πm;
• is indifferent between LS, SP and LF if
1
2
(1− α)πm ≤ f.
Proposition 4.1 states that even an antitrust limit that leads to an ex post Pareto
improvement, as the Shapiro policy compared to the lump-sum policy, can decrease
the patentholder’s profit and increase the entrant’s profit ex ante. Intuitively, a
less restrictive limit increases the entrant’s profit. Hence, market entry occurs for
a higher level of f . This market entry implies that the patentholder has to pass
some profits from his patent to the entrant, which leaves the patentee worse off.
Therefore, a patentholder prefers a restrictive limit if this limit effectively prevents
market entry. Otherwise, he prefers the less restrictive limit to maximize the bar-
gaining surplus.
We have seen that low antitrust limits may trigger additional market entry. From
a social point of view, it is questionable if this market entry is welfare enhancing.
Proposition 4.2 Assume that a potential lawsuit or settlement takes place after
market entry. A laissez-faire policy never increases the social welfare compared to
a lump-sum policy or to the Shapiro policy. Hence, a laissez-faire policy is weakly
dominated from a social point of view.
In contrast, in comparison to the lump-sum policy, the Shapiro policy
• increases welfare if the entry costs are low f ≤ πc(1− α);
• increases or decreases welfare if the entry costs are medium πc(1− α) < f <
1
2λ + π
c(1− α);
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• does not change welfare if the entry costs are high f ≥ 12λ + πc(1− α).
Proof. See Appendix.
Given a laissez-faire policy, the consumer surplus is always CSm and total profits
are πm − f after entry. Furthermore, this regime triggers additional market entry.
Due to the fact that neither the consumer surplus nor the the total profits change,
these entry costs are wasted resources from a social point of view. Therefore, the
social welfare cannot be higher under a laissez-faire policy compared to the other
two policies. In the following we compare the Shaprio policy to the lump-sum policy.
If the entry costs f are low, applying the Shapiro policy does not change the
market entry decision of the potential market entrant compared to the lump-sum
policy. He always enters with low entry costs. If the entrant enters the market any-
way, then the Shapiro policy yields a Pareto improvement. Therefore, it is welfare
enhancing.
If f is high enough, then the entrant neither enters under the Shapiro policy nor
under the lump-sum policy. Therefore, social welfare is the same under both limits.
The welfare analysis is not obvious in the case of medium entry costs. The
Shapiro policy leads to more market entry than the lump-sum policy. Therefore,
the Shapiro policy can increase consumer surplus by inducing additional entry. On
the other hand, this market entry decreases joint profits and entry costs occur.
In sum, total welfare may decrease if the entry costs are corresponding high. For
an illustration, consider the extreme case where f approaches the upper bound
1
2λ + π
c(1− α). Social welfare is in this case
WLS = CSm + πm, with a lump-sum policy, and
WSP = CSs + Πs − f, with the Shapiro policy.
Simple calculations show that
W s −Wns = (1− α)(CSc − CSm) + (Πs − πm)− f. (4.9)
If f approaches the upper bound f = 12λ + π
c(1 − α), then social welfare is lower
when the settlement is allowed if
(1− α)(CSc − CSm) + (Πs − πm) < 1
2
[Πs − απm] (4.10)
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⇔ (1− α)(CSc − CSm) < 1
2
(πm −Πs) + 1− α
2
πm (4.11)
⇔ (1− α)(CSc − CSm) < (1− α)(πm − πc)− 1
2
λ. (4.12)
This will be more likely the case if the demand is more inelastic. Competition
only moderately increases consumer surplus and hence the difference CSc−CSm is
not large. For example, this is satisfied for all α < 1 with linear demand P = 1− bQ
and Cournot competition (with zero marginal cost for both firms).11
4.4 Scenario 2: Bargaining before Sinking the
full Entry Costs
In this second scenario we assume that the entrant can challenge the patent when-
ever he wants. Therefore, he can even litigate before the full entry costs have been
sunk. This is in contrast to Scenario 1. Furthermore, we assume that the entrant
can sink parts of the entry costs before the bargaining starts. This can change his
bargaining position as we will see later on. Figure 4.2 shows the structure of the
game.
Obviously, it makes only sense to go to court for the entrant if his remaining
entry costs are smaller than the duopoly profit πc. Otherwise, even if he succeeds
in the lawsuit, he will stay off the market. Hence, the patentholder can deny any
bargaining as long as the entrants remaining entry costs are higher than πc because
the entrant’s threat point, to go to court and to enter the market if he succeeds, is
not credible.
As in Scenario 1, we start by considering the case of a lump-sum policy.
Lump-Sum Policy (LS)
There is no scope for a bargaining solution under a lump-sum policy. Even if the
entrant has a credible threat point, the cooperative value of a settlement is lower
than the sum of the outside options. It follows that a lawsuit occurs if f ≤ πc.
11see Appendix.
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Figure 4.2: Scenario 2
Finding 4.4: Assume that settlements have to obey the lump-sum policy and
that a potential lawsuit or bargaining can take place before the full entry costs have
been sunk. If
• f ≤ πc, then a lawsuit occurs;
• f > πc, then the entrant stays off the market.
Laissez-Faire Policy (LF)
Given a laissez-faire policy, there can be scope for a bargaining solution. Suppose
that f ≤ πc. This implies that the entrant has a credible threat to sue and thus a
credible threat point in the bargaining. Due to the fact that bargaining takes place
before market entry, the parties incorporate f in their bargaining. Thus, they split
up πm − f in the bargaining stage. This is less than in the corresponding case of
Scenario 1 where the bargaining profit was πm. In particular now it is possible that
πm − f is smaller than the sum of the outside options
πm − f < (απm + (1− α)πc)− (1− α)(πc − f); (4.13)
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⇔ πm − 2πc < α
1− αf. (4.14)
In this case bargaining breaks down and the parties meet each other before court.
The remaining question is if the potential entrant can achieve a settlement with
f > πc. On a first glance it seems that the entrant has no credible threat to sue and
to enter the market if he succeeds before court. Hence, the incumbent can simply
deny any bargaining because he knows that the entrant will never enter the market
anyway. However, the entrant can strategically sink some parts of the fixed costs in
order to get ”tough”. After sinking parts of the entry costs, to sue and to enter the
market if he succeds, can be a credible threat. Hence, after the entrant has sunk a
certain part of the entry costs, the incumbent can no longer deny any bargaining.
This raises the question what is the optimal amount of entry costs w that the
entrant should sink in order get tough for the bargaining.
Lemma 4.1 The optimal w that the entrant should sink in order to get tough is
w = f − πc.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, increasing w by one unit decreases E’s profit exactly by one unit. At
the same time, it increases his outside option by (1 − α) units and the bargaining
surplus by α. Due to the fact that the entrant gets 12 of the bargaining surplus, sink-
ing w makes only sense to get tough. Obviously, the entrant stays off the market
and does not sink f if f is too high. In this case it is possible that the payoff from
a settlement is not high enough to make up for the market entry costs. Given this,
the following equilibrium occurs.
Finding 4.5: Assume that settlements have to obey the laissez-faire policy and
that a potential lawsuit or bargaining can take place before the full entry costs have
been sunk.
If f ≤ πc, there occurs
• no settlement but a lawsuit if πm − 2πc < α1−αf ;
• a settlement if πm − 2πc ≥ α1−αf .
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If πc < f ≤ 12 [(1− α)πm + απc)], there occurs
• neither a settlement nor a lawsuit if (1− α)πm < πc;
• a settlement if (1− α)πm ≥ πc.
If 12 [(1− α)πm + απc] < f , there occurs neither a settlement nor a lawsuit.
Proof. See Appendix.
Shapiro Policy (SP)
Given the Shapiro policy, the firms can split up Πs−f by settling out of court. This
is less compared to a laissez-faire policy Πs − f ≤ πm − f . Thus, the region of f
decreases where entry occurs. If f > πc, the entrant can have an incentive to sink
w = f −πc in order to get tough, as long as his entry costs are not too high. As the
intuition is the same as above, we directly state the resulting equilibrium.
Finding 4.6: Assume that settlements have to obey the Shapiro policy and that
a potential lawsuit or bargaining can take place before the full entry costs have been
sunk.
If f ≤ πc, there occurs
• no settlement but a lawsuit if λ < αf ;
• a settlement if λ ≥ αf .
If πc < f ≤ πc(1− 12α) + 12λ, there occurs
• neither a settlement nor a lawsuit if λ < απc;
• a settlement if λ ≥ απc.
If πc(1− 12α) + 12λ < f , there occurs neither a settlement nor a lawsuit.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Discussion
We see that the entrant’s ranking of the different policies is the same as before.
He prefers less restrictive limits to more restrictive limits. Thus, the laissez-faire
policy is better than the Shapiro policy, and the Shapiro policy is better than the
lump-sum policy.
In contrast, the patentholder trades off the following effects. On the one hand,
less restrictive limits imply higher joint profits and therefore higher payoffs from a
settlement. On the other hand, higher payoffs may trigger additional market entry,
which leaves the patentholder worse off. We summarize the different possible rank-
ings for the patentholder in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3 Assume that a potential lawsuit or settlement can take place
before the full entry cost have been sunk. The patentholder
1. is indifferent between SP, LS and LF if
a) there is always no entry: (1− α)πm < πc ∧ πc < f < 12 [(1− α)πm + απc];
b) there is always no entry: 12 [(1− α)πm + απc] < f ;
c) there is always a lawsuit: f < πc ∧ (1− α)(πm − 2πc) < αf .
2. prefers LS and SP to LF and is indifferent between LS and SP if there is only
a settlement under LF
a) πc(1− 12α) + 12λ ≤ f < 12 [(1− α)πm + απc] ∧ (1− α)πm ≥ πc; or
b) πc ≤ f < πc(1− 12α) + 12λ ∧ λ < απc < (1− α)(πm − 2πc).
3. prefers LS to LF to SP if there is no entry under LS and there are settlements
under LF and SP
πc < f < 12λ + π
c(1− 12α) ∧ λ > απc.
4. prefers LF to SP to LS if there are always settlements
f < πc ∧ λ > αf.
5. prefers LF to SP and LS and is indifferent between SP and LS if there is a
lawsuit under SP and LS and a settlement under LF
f < πc ∧ λ < αf < (1− α)(πm − 2πc).
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Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, there is never market entry in (1a) and (1b) because either the entry
costs are too high or because no scope exists for a bargaining solution. There is
always market entry in (1c) without scope for a bargaining solution. Therefore, a
lawsuit occurs. In all these cases antitrust limits play no role. In (2) only the laissez-
faire policy leads to a settlement. The other two policies yield neither a settlement
nor a lawsuit. The Shapiro policy and the lump-sum policy prevent entry because
either the entry costs are too high or because no scope exists for a bargaining solu-
tion. Therefore, the patentholder prefers the two more restrictive policies because
they protect him from passing profits to the entrant. In (3) only the lump-sum
policy prevents market entry. The Shapiro policy and the laissez-faire policy lead
to market entry. Given market entry under both policies, the patentholder prefers
the laissez-faire policy as the less restrictive regime compared to the Shapiro policy.
In (4) no antitrust limit prevents market entry and all policies yield a settlement.
Thus, the patentholder prefers less restrictive limits to more restrictive limits. In
(5) only a laissez-faire policy leads to a settlement and the other two limits lead to
a lawsuit. Thus, the patentholder prefers the laissez-faire policy and is indifferent
between the other two policies.
Again, from a social point of view, we derive that the laissez-faire policy is weakly
dominated by the Shapiro policy and the lump-sum policy. Intuitively, market entry
does not change joint profits or consumer surplus under a laissez-faire policy. Thus,
only the additional entry costs occur, which decreases social welfare. The compar-
ison between the Shapiro policy and a lump-sum policy leads to the same results
as in the scenario before. The Shapiro policy increases social welfare for low entry
costs, the comparison is ambiguous for medium entry costs and social welfare is the
same for high entry costs. Only the threshold levels of f change because a court
decision is possible before entry occurs.
Proposition 4.4 Assume that a potential lawsuit or settlement can take place
before the full entry cost have been sunk. From a social point of view, the laissez-
faire policy is weakly dominated by the lump-sum policy and the Shapiro policy.
Comparing the Shapiro policy to the lump-sum policy shows that
• the welfare is higher under the Shaprio policy for low entry costs f ≤ πc;
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• the welfare comparison is ambiguous for medium entry costs πc < f ≤ 12λ +
(1− α)πc;
• the welfare is the same under both antitrust limits for high entry costs f >
1
2λ + (1− α)πc.
Proof. See Appendix.
In the following we describe the intuition for the different welfare outcomes if
one compares the Shapiro policy to the lump-sum policy. We start with medium
entry costs and then consider low and high entry costs.
For medium entry costs, the intuition is the same as in Scenario 1. On the one
hand, market entry occurs for higher levels of entry costs under the Shapiro policy
than under the lump-sum policy. This is due to the efficiency gain that the firms can
appropriate under the Shapiro policy. This additional entry increases the consumer
surplus. On the other hand, the firms have to incur the entry costs. This trade-off
can go in either direction.
Given low entry costs, one could have the impression that the lump-sum policy
does not have to be better than the Shapiro policy. On the one hand, firms can
realize the efficiency gain by a settlement under the Shapiro policy. On the other
hand, they have to pay the entry costs for sure. Hence, it might be that the entry
costs outweigh the efficiency gains. But if this had been the case, then the firms
would rather choose to have a trial instead of a settlement. Intuitively, the consumer
surplus has to be the same from a settlement as from a court decision. The firms
decide whether to settle or not with respect to their joint profits. This coincides
with welfare maximization.
Given high entry costs, no entry occurs under both policies. Thus, social welfare
is the same under both antitrust limits.
CHAPTER 4. PATENT SETTLEMENTS AND MARKET ENTRY 101
4.5 Scenario 3: Bargaining Without Having
to Incur the Entry Costs
Let us now assume that it is possible to write settlement contracts in such a way
that the entrant does not have to enter the market. Hence, he can avoid incur-
ring f . A possible contract would be that the entrant stays off the market and
receives a compensation payment from the patentholder, a so called ”reverse pay-
ment”. Such kinds of settlements have been seen quite often in the Pharmaceutical
Industry.12 The FTC set up a study about such settlements because these are obvi-
ously suspicious from an antitrust perspective (FTC (2002)). We are interested in
the consequences of these settlements on firms’ profits and on social welfare.
Figure 4.3: Scenario 3
As in Scenario 2, we assume that the entrant can sink parts of his entry costs,
which can be infinitesimal, before a bargaining occurs. If the incumbent still denies
a bargaining after the entrant has sunk parts of the entry cost, then the entrant has
again the option to sink parts of entry costs. Only when the entrant decides not
to sink a further part of the entry costs and no court decision or settlement occurs,
then the patentholder remains monopolist. Figure 4.3 shows the game structure.
12FTC (2002)
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Lump-Sum Policy
A lump-sum policy constrains the cooperative value of a settlement to 2πc. In
contrast to Scenario 1 and 2, entry costs can be avoided by a settlement. Thus, if
the fixed costs are high enough f ≥ α1−α(πm − 2πc), there is scope for a bargaining
solution
2πc − [απm + (1− α)πc − (1− α)(πc − f)] ≥ 0; (4.15)
⇔ f ≥ α
1− α(π
m − 2πc). (4.16)
As in Scenario 1 and 2, the question remains if the entrant can achieve a set-
tlement with f > πc. On a first glance it seems as if the entrant’s outside option
is not to sue and to stay off the market. Hence, there might be no reason for the
patentholder to settle with the potential entrant because the entrant has no credible
threat to sue. But again, the potential entrant can incur parts of the entry costs in
order to get tough. After incurring parts of the entry costs ex ante, to sue and to
enter the market if he succeeds, can get optimal ex post.
But in Scenario 3, where the firms can settle without incurring the entry costs,
the entrant’s upfront sinking of parts of the fixed costs is a wasting of resources. A
rational patentholder anticipates the possible strategic actions of the entrant. Thus,
both firms can do better if they avoid the sinking of parts of the entry costs. Instead,
they should include these costs in the bargaining. This leads to the following market
equilibrium.
Finding 4.7: Assume that settlements have to obey the lump-sum policy and
that a potential lawsuit or settlement can take place before the full entry costs have
been sunk. Furthermore, the remaining entry costs do not have to be incurred with
a settlement.
1. There is a lawsuit if f ≤ πc ∧ f < α1−α(πm − 2πc).
2. There is neither a lawsuit nor a settlement if
a) πc < f ≤ 2πc + α(πc − πm) ∧ πc < α1−α(πm − 2πc), or
b) f > 2πc + α(πc − πm).
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3. There is a settlement if
a) f < πc ∧ f ≥ α1−α(πm − 2πc), or
b) πc ≤ f ≤ 2πc + α(πc − πm) ∧ πc ≥ α1−α(πm − 2πc).
Proof. See Appendix.
In the first case the entry costs are so small that no scope exists for a bargaining
solution. Hence, the entrant challenges the patent. In the first part of the second
case no scope exists for a bargaining solution, too. Hence, the entrant anticipates
that he gets no settlement even if he sinks parts of his entry costs. Therefore, he
stays off the market. The entry costs are so high in (2b) that the entrant stays off
the market. In contrast, in case (3) the parties settle because there is scope for a
bargaining solution.
Laissez-Faire Policy
Given a laissez-faire policy, there is always scope for a bargaining solution and a
lawsuit never occurs in equilibrium. The joint profits from a settlement have the
highest possible value πm because the parties can avoid the entry costs f .
As in the cases before, the potential entrant can achieve a settlement with f > πc
by sinking parts of the entry costs. A rational patentholder anticipates this possible
strategic action of the entrant. Thus, both firms can do better by including these
costs in the bargaining. Only if the entry costs are too high, then a settlement does
not pay off for the potential entrant.
Finding 4.8: Assume that settlements have to obey the laissez-faire policy and
that a potential lawsuit or settlement can take place before the full entry costs have
been sunk. Furthermore, the remaining entry costs do not have to be incurred
with a settlement. If f ≤ (1 − α)(πm − πc) + πc, then a settlement occurs. If
f > (1− α)(πm − πc) + πc, then the patentholder remains monopolist.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Shapiro Policy (SP)
The analysis is the same as above under the Shapiro policy. Only the cooperative
value of a settlement decreases from πm to aπm+(1−α)2πc+λ. Thus, the threshold
level of f where entry occurs decreases because the entrant’s profit from entering
decreases.
Finding 4.9: Assume that settlements have to obey the Shapiro policy and that
a potential lawsuit or settlement can take place before the full entry costs have been
sunk. Furthermore, the remaining entry costs do not have to be incurred with a
settlement. If f ≤ λ + πc(2 − α), then a settlement occurs. If f > λ + πc(2 − α),
then the patentholder remains monopolist.
Proof. See Appendix.
Discussion
Once again we see that the entrant prefers a less restrictive policy to a more re-
strictive policy. In contrast, the ranking depends on the actual level of f for the
patentholder. If a certain regime is able to prevent market entry, then he prefers this
one. Otherwise, he prefers a less restrictive regime in order to increase his payoff
from the settlement.
Proposition 4.5 Assume that a potential lawsuit or settlement can take place before
the full entry costs have been sunk. Furthermore, the remaining entry costs do not
have to be incurred by the entrant with a settlement. The patentholder
1. prefers LF to SP to LS if
a) f < πc, or
b) πc ≤ f < 2πc + α(πc − πm) ∧ f ≥ α1−α(πm − 2πc);
2. prefers LS to LF to SP if
a) πc ≤ f < 2πc + α(πc − πm) ∧ f < α1−α(πm − 2πc), or
b) 2πc + α(πc − πm) ≤ f < λ + πc(2− α);
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3. is indifferent between LS and SP but prefers both antitrust limits to LF if
λ + πc(2− α ≤ f < (1− α)(πm − πc) + πc;
4. is indifferent between LS, SP and LF if (1− α)(πm − πc) + πc ≤ f .
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, in case (1) the entry costs are in such a way that no antitrust limit
prevents a settlement or a lawsuit. Given this, the patentholder would like to have
a less restrictive limit. Therefore, his ranking is laissez-faire to Shapiro to a lump-
sum policy. If the entry costs are in such a way that a lump-sum policy prevents
a settlement or lawsuit (2), then the patentholder’s profit is maximal and equal to
πm under a lump-sum policy. Thus, he prefers a lump-sum policy to the two other
policies. Comparing the remaining two policies, we see that a settlement occurs un-
der both. Thus, he prefers the less restrictive one, namely the laissez-faire approach.
In case (3) the lump-sum and the Shapiro policy prevent a settlement or a lawsuit.
Thus, his profit is πm under both policies. Furthermore, a settlement occurs under
a laissez-faire policy. Therefore, the profits of the patentholder are lower under a
laissez-faire policy compared to the other two limits. In case (4) the entry costs are
so high that neither a settlement nor a lawsuit occurs under all policies. Hence, the
patentholder is indifferent between the three antitrust limits because his profit is
always πm.
With regard to social welfare, a laissez-faire policy is weakly dominated by the
two other policies. Interestingly, the Shapiro policy is weakly better than the lump-
sum policy in nearly all cases. Only if a lump-sum policy yields a settlement, the
lump-sum policy is better than the Shapiro policy.
Proposition 4.6 Assume that settlements have to obey the lump-sum policy and
that a potential lawsuit or settlement can take place before the full entry costs have
been sunk. Furthermore, the remaining entry costs do not have to be incurred by
the entrant with a settlement. From a social point of view, the laissez-faire policy
is weakly dominated by the lump-sum policy and by the Shapiro policy. The Shapiro
policy weakly dominates the lump-sum policy in nearly all cases. Only if πc < f ≤
2πc + α(πc − πm) ∧ πc ≥ α1−α(πm − 2πc) or f ≤ πc ∧ f ≥ α1−α(πm − 2πc), then the
lump-sum policy is better than the Shapiro policy.
Proof. See Appendix.
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The resulting market price is always pm under a laissez-faire policy. Entry costs
do not have to be incurred. Hence, they are irrelevant from a social point of view.
Therefore, every antitrust limit which leads, at least in some cases, to a lower price
than pm is better. This implies that the laissez-faire policy is weakly dominated by
the other two antitrust limits.
Comparing the Shapiro policy with the lump-sum policy shows that the Shapiro
policy is always better if the lump-sum policy leads to a lawsuit. The consumer
surplus is the same under both policies. However under the Shaprio policy the
parties realize the efficiency gain λ and avoid the fixed costs. Only if the lump-
sum policy leads to a settlement f ≤ 2πc + α(πc − πm) ∧ πc ≥ α1−α(πm − 2πc) or
f < πc ∧ f ≥ α1−α(πm− 2πc), then the lump-sum policy is better because it yields a
lower price compared to the Shapiro policy.
4.6 Post-Grant Challenge and Antitrust Lim-
its to Settlements
In this section we link our findings to the actual debate about the patent system
and the antitrust limits to patent settlements.
There is an ongoing discussion about how to organize a post-grant challenge and
review process. Hall and Harhoff (2004) consider different design choices. In par-
ticular they argue that there should be no restrictions on the type of opponent who
is allowed to challenge the patent. Thus, a challenger does not have to show that
he is involved in an infringement suit or that the patentee is threatening him to sue
for infringement. Shapiro (2004) even proposes that third parties should have the
right to initiate a post-grant challenge any time during the lifetime of the patent.
These proposals are different to the actual US legislation regarding patent litigation
where a patent can be challenged only by an alleged or threatened infringer. Hall
and Harhoff (2004) argue that leaving out such restrictions enables public-interest
groups and non-governmental organizations to participate. Hence, it may give ac-
cess to more information regarding prior art.
We would like to point out that a system that allows everyone to challenge a
patent has another important impact. In our view, it is not only about enabling
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public-interest groups or non-governmental organizations to challenge, but it is more
about enabling potential entrants. These firms usually have the best knowledge
about prior art because it deals with their core business. Under the current US law,
a competitor can only litigate the validity of a patent when he is involved in an
infringement suit or when he can show that the patentee is actually threatening him
to sue. Given such regulations, the patentee can force the entrant to sink his entry
costs before he agrees to bargain over a license because the entrant has no threat
point before sinking f . As we have shown, this introduces a kind of hold-up problem
and it weakens the entrant’s bargaining position. Consequently, this decreases the
entrant’s payoff and leads to less market entry.13 In contrast, if it is possible to
challenge a patent without having to be involved in an infringement suit or with-
out having to show a concrete threat, then the entrant can bargain over a licensing
contract before incurring the entry costs. Hence, the entrant can include his entry
costs in the bargaining, which increases his profit. In the end, such a post-grant
challenge system where everyone can challenge a patent expands the range of entry
costs under which market entry occurs. Therefore, the number of lawsuits and the
number of licensing contracts should increase. But as we have shown, such a system
can backfire from a social point of view. It may generate too high incentives for
market entry and it may decrease social welfare due to the entry costs (see Scenario
2). This is particularly true if the antitrust authority uses a laissez-faire approach
to settlements.
Another issue we would like to stress is that it is not obvious that low antitrust
limits to settlements are always in the interest of a patentee and thus increase R&D
incentives. In contrast, the patentholder can gain from more restrictive antitrust
limits that avoid additional market entry. These findings are in contrast to Shapiro
(2003). Without considering market entry, he shows that his rule fully respects the
patentholder’s rights and never decreases his payoff. We show that this is no longer
true with endogenous market entry. We conclude that keeping the incentives for
R&D high and having restrictive antitrust limits do not necessarily work against
each other, but possibly they go hand in hand.
Regarding antitrust limits to patent settlements, we have shown that a laissez-
faire policy is definitely not desirable from a social point of view. Interestingly, in
the recent past courts have approved settlements that heavily restrain competition
regardless of the validity (or the probability of the validity) of the patent, as long
13Compare Scenario 1 to 2.
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as it is not total obvious that the patent is invalid.14 To cite from the District
Court in In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation (2005): ”In sum,
it is inappropriate for an antitrust court, in determining the reasonableness of a
patent settlement agreement, to conduct an after-the-fact inquiry into the validity
of the underlying patent. Such an inquiry would undermine any certainty for patent
litigants seeking to settle their disputes. (...) To summarize, it would be inappro-
priate to engage in an after-the-fact analysis of the patent’s likely validity. Nor is
it appropriate to discount the exclusionary power of the patent by any probability
that the patent would haven been found invalid.” In our opinion, this approach goes
completely in the wrong direction of a laissez-faire policy.
But even an ex-post Pareto improvement, as the Shapiro policy, is not always
optimal. At least, such a rule is definitely better than the laissez-faire policy. Tak-
ing all together, we have to conclude that to the best of our knowledge, there is no
easy general rule applicable to all cases. Antitrust authorities and the courts should
therefore rely on the ”rule of reason” and treat a given settlement term differently
in different circumstances.
The Federal Trade Commission challenged several settlements that included so
called reverse payments, which are very common in the Pharmaceutical Industry.
These reverse payments usually go from the patentholder to the licensor. In ex-
change, the licensor agrees not to enter the market for a certain period of time.
Several authors stress the anti-competitive impact of such settlements.15 In con-
trast, we would like to point out that these contracts avoid the fixed costs of entry
(Scenario 3). Without reverse payments, the parties must rely on price fixing or ter-
ritorial agreements, which may lead to the same consumer welfare, but only make
the firms worse off and hence decrease social welfare.
14Examples include the District Court approach in In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation
(E.D.N.Y. 2005), the Eleventh Circuit’s approach in Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharma., Inc. 344 F.3d
1294 (11th Cir. 2003), the Sixth Circuit’s approach in In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896
(6th Cir. 2003), and the District Court’s approach in In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 277 F. Supp.
2d 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)
15For example Farrell and Shapiro (2005) or Bulow (2004).
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4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have studied the implications of antitrust limits to patent settle-
ments on market entry incentives. We have considered three different antitrust lim-
its: laissez-faire policy, lump-sum policy and the Shapiro policy. Counter-intuitively,
a patentholder can prefer more restrictive antitrust limits. Furthermore, the paten-
tholder’s profits and the social welfare can decrease under the Shapiro policy com-
pared to a lump-sum policy. This is in contrast to the findings of Shapiro (2003),
who does not consider market entry.
In this context we discussed several different scenarios when the bargaining or a
lawsuit takes place. A patentholder prefers bargaining or lawsuits after the entrant
has sunk his entry costs. The opposite is true for the entrant. An early bargaining
allows the entrant to incorporate his fixed costs in the bargaining. This increases
the range of entry costs under which market entry occurs. Hence, a strengthening
of the post-grant challenge system does not only increase the participation of public
or private interest parties. Furthermore, potential competitors get more incentives
to participate in the market, which decreases the patentee’s profits.
Reflecting on our results, they crucially depend on the inability of the paten-
tholder to commit not to license his product. This raises the questions if the paten-
tholder has any opportunities to do this? For the patentee one possibility might be
to give an exclusive license to the first entrant in order to avoid additional market
entry. Further potential entrants anticipate that they would have to go through a
trial for sure if they entered the market. Therefore, it might be better for them to
stay off the market. To consider such an argument, one has to extend our model to at
least two entrants. This introduces another important issue, namely the free-rider
problem. An entrant who has successfully challenged a patent provides a public
good. In our opinion, it leaves room for further research to build a model with sev-
eral entrants and an appropriate timing in order to analyze such a new motivation
for exclusive licensing.
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4.8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.1
Lump-Sum Policy
πLSP =
{
απm + (1− α)πc if f < (1− α)πc
πm if f ≥ (1− α)πc
Laissez-Faire Policy
πLFP =
{
1
2(1 + α)π
m if f < 12(1− α)πm
πm if f ≥ 12(1− α)πm
Shapiro-Policy
πSPP =
{
(απm + (1− α)πc) + 12λ if f < 12λ + (1− α)πc
πm if f ≥ 12λ + (1− α)πc
because if f < 12λ + (1− α)πc then
πP = (απm + (1− α)πc) + 12[Π
s − (απm + (1− α)πc))− (1− α)(πc)]
πP = (απm + (1− α)πc) + 12λ.
Comparison
If f < πc(1− α) then πLFP > πSPP > πLSP .
If πc(1− α) ≤ f < 12λ + πc(1− α) then πLSP > πLFP > πSPp .
If 12λ + π
c(1− α) ≤ f < 12(1− α)πm then πLSP = πSPP > πLFP .
If 12(1− α)πm ≤ f then πLSP = πLFP = πSPP .
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Proof of Proposition 4.2
1. Lump-Sum Policy:
WLS =
{
α(CSm + πm) + (1− α)(CSc + 2πc)− f if f < (1− α)πc
CSm + πm if f ≥ (1− α)πc
2. Laissez-Faire Policy:
WLF =
{
CSm + πm − f if f < 12(1− α)πm
CSm + πm if f ≥ 12(1− α)πm
3. Shapiro Policy:
WSP =
{
α(CSm + πm) + (1− α)(CSc + 2πc) + λ− f if f < 12λ + (1− α)πc
CSm + πm if f ≥ 12λ + (1− α)πc
Part 1: A laisser-faire policy never increases the social welfare compared to a
lump-sum policy or to the Shapiro policy.
Because of
CSm + πm < α(CSm + πm) + (1− α)(CSc + 2πc)
CSm + πm < CSc + 2πc
and
1
2
(1− α)πm ≥ 1
2
λ + (1− α)πc ≥ (1− α)πc
it directly follows that
WLF ≤ WSP ∧WLF ≤ WSP ∀f.
Part 2: Shapiro policy in comparison to the lump-sum policy
1. To show: WSP ≥ WLS if f < πc(1− α)
WSP = α(CSm + πm) + (1− α)(CSc + 2πc) + λ− f ≥
α(CSm + πm) + (1− α)(CSc + 2πc)− f = WLS
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λ ≥ 0
2. To show: WSP Q WLS if πc(1− α) ≤ f ≤ 12λ + πc(1− α)
We know that (1− α)[πm − 2πc] ≥ λ ≥ 0 because of
πm ≥ Πs = απm + 2(1− α)πc + λ.
Example: WSP Q WLS with f = (1− α)πc and λ = (1− α)[πm − 2πc]
WSP = α(CSm + πm) + (1− α)(CSc + 2πc) + λ− f Q CSm + πm = WLS
α(CSm) + (1− α)(CSc)− (1− α)πc Q CSm
CSc − CSm Q πc
This is true because without more restrictions CSc −CSm can be smaller or bigger
than πc.
3. To show: WSP = WLS if f > 12λ + π
c(1− α)
With f > 12λ + π
c(1− α) we directly have WSP = WLS = CSm + πm.
Shapiro Policy vs. Lump-Sum Policy with Cournot Competition
Demand function: p = 1− bx
Monopoly: πm = 14b ; CS
m = 12 ; p =
1
2 ; x =
1
2b
Duopoly: πc = 19b ; CS
c = 29b ; p =
1
3 x1 = x2 =
1
3b
Price ps with a settlement:
CS(ps) = αCSm + αCSc
1
2
(1− ps)(1− ps
b
) = a
1
8b
+ (1− a) 2
9b
ps = 1− 16
√
(−7α + 16)
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Resulting joint profits Πs:
ΠS = (1− 1
6
√
(−7α + 16)) ∗ 1− (1−
1
6
√
(−7α + 16))
b
=
− 1
36
(
−6 +
√
(−7α + 16)
) √(−7α + 16)
b
This yields the following λ
λ =
1
6
√
(−7a + 16) + a− 4
b
.
Calculating the critical λ where lump-sum is better than Shapiro:
α(
1
8b
+
1
4b
) + (1− α)( 2
9b
+
2
9b
) +
1
6
√
(−7α + 16) + α− 4
b
− f < 1
8b
+
1
4b
Hence with f > fcrit = − 172
−7a+43−12
√
(−7a+16)
b lump-sum policy is better.
To show fmin = (1− α)πc > fcrit.
1
9b
(1− α) > − 1
72
−7α + 43− 12
√
(−7α + 16)
b
− 1
24
−17 + 5a + 4
√
(−7a + 16)
b
> 0∀α ∈ [0; 1]
Proof of Lemma 4.1
What is the optimal amount w he should sink in the first place?
Entrant’s payoff with settlement after entry:
πsE = (1−α)(πc−(f−w))+
1
2
[πm−(f−w)−[απm+(1−α)πc]−(1−α)(πc−(f−w))]−w
πsE =
1
2
[πm − (f − w)− [απm + (1− α)πc] + (1− α)(πc − (f − w))]− w
∂πsE
∂w
=
1
2
[1 + (1− α)]− 1 < 0
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Hence, we have a corner solution. The entrant should sink only the amount to
get a non-negative threat point:
πc = f − w.
Proof of Finding 4.5
To show: Upper bound of f
πe = (1− α)(πc − f ′) + 1
2
[πm − f ′ − απm − (1− α)πc − (1− α)(πc − f ′)]− w ≥ 0.
By f ′ we denote the remaining entry costs which get incorporated in the bar-
gaining.
We know that f ′ = πc (Lemma 4.1). Hence,
πe =
1
2
[πm − πc − απm − (1− α)πc]− (f − πc) ≥ 0;
πe =
1
2
[(1− α)πm + απc] ≥ f.
Hence, the entrant enters if f ≤ 12 [(1− α)πm + απc].
To show: If πc < f ≤ 12 [(1−α)πm +απc, then there is a settlement if πm−2πc <
α
1−απ
c.
We know that the entrant has to sink f − πc for the bargaining with πc < f ≤
1
2 [(1− α)πm + απc. Given πc as the remaining entry costs, there is a settlement if
πm − πc − (απm + (1− α)πc)− (1− α)(πc − πc) ≤ 0
⇔ (1− α)πm ≥ πc
⇔ πm − 2πc ≥ α
1− απ
c
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Proof of Finding 4.6
Part 1: f ≤ πc
There is no scope for bargaining if
Πs − f < απm + (1− α)2πc + (1− α)(−f).
We defined λ through
λ = Πs − απm − (1− α)2πc.
This leads to
λ− f < −(1− α)f ;
λ < αf.
Part 2: πc < f ≤ πc(1− 12) + 12λ
Using Lemma 4.1, we know that f − w = πc = f ′. There is no scope for
bargaining after sinking w if
Πs − πc < απm + (1− α)2πc + (1− α)(−πc).
We defined λ through
λ = Πs − απm − (1− α)2πc.
This leads to
λ− πc < −(1− α)πc;
λ < απc.
With λ ≥ απc a settlement leads to the following entrant’s profit:
πsE =
1
2
[Πs − (f − w)− [απm + (1− α)πc] + (1− α)(πc − (f − w)]− (f − πc)
πsE =
1
2
[Πs − πc − (απm + (1− α)πc)]− (f − πc)
πsE =
1
2
[λ + (1− α)πc − πc]− f + πc
πsE =
1
2
[λ− απc]− f + πc
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If this expression is negative then it does not pay off to achieve a settlement for
the entrant. Hence, the critical value of f is
f =
1
2
λ + πc[1− 1
2
α].
Proof of Proposition 4.3
1. is indifferent between SP, LS, LF if
a) there is always no entry: (1−α)πm < πc and πc < f < 12 [(1−α)πm + απc]
• from Finding 4.4 no entry under LS because f > πc
• from Finding 4.5 no entry under LF because(1 − α)πm < πc and πc <
f < 12 [(1− α)πm + απc]
• from Finding 4.6 no entry under SP because f > πc and λ < απc. This
follows from (1− α)πm < πc. We know that
Πs − λ ≤ πm
απm + (1− α)2πc + λ ≤ πm
λmax = (1− α)(πm − 2πc)
Combining with λ < απc yields
(1− α)(πm − 2πc) < απc
(1− α)πm < απc + (1− α)2πc
(1− α)πm < (1− α)πc + πc
This is always true with (1− α)πm < πc.
With no entry anyway, the profits are always πm.
b) there is always no entry: 12 [(1− α)πm + απc] < f
This comes directly from Finding 4.4-4.6. With no entry anyway the profits
are always πm.
c) there is always a lawsuit: f < πc and (1− α)(πm − 2πc) < αf
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• from Finding 4.4 and f < πc it directly follows that there is a lawsuit
under LS.
• from Finding 4.5 and (1− α)(πm − 2πc) < αf it follows directly that is
a lawsuit under LF.
• (1 − α)(πm − 2πc) < αf implies that λ < αf because we know that
λmax = (1− α)(πm − 2πc). Then from Finding 4.6 it is straight forward
that a lawsuit occurs under SP.
If there is always a lawsuit then the profit is under each policy απm+(1−α)πc.
2. prefers LS and SP to LF and is indifferent between LS and SP if there is only
a settlement under LF
a) πc(1− 12α) + 12λ ≤ f < 12 [(1− α)πm + απc] and (1− α)πm ≥ πc
• from Finding 4.4 and f > πc it directly follows that there is no entry
under LS
• from Finding 4.6 and πc(1− 12α) + 12λ ≤ f it directly follows that there
is no entry under SP
• from Finding 4.5 and πc(1 − 12α) + 12λ ≤ f < 12 [(1 − α)πm + απc] and
(1− α)πm ≥ πc it follows there is no settlement under LF.
Hence, profits under LF and SP are πm. These are always higher than the
profits from the settlement under LF because the joint profits are smaller than
the monopoly profits:
f − w = πc
⇒ πm − (f − w) ≤ πm
b) πc ≤ f < πc(1− 12α) + 12λ and λ < απc < (1− α)(πm − 2πc)
• from Finding 4.4 and πc < f it directly follows that there is no entry
under LS
• from Finding 4.6 and λ < απc it directly follows that there is no entry
under SP
• from Finding 4.5, απc < (1−α)(πm−2πc) and πc ≤ f < πc(1− 12α)+ 12λ
it follows there is a settlement under LF.
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Hence, profits under LF and SP are πm. These are always higher than the
profits with LF under the settlement because the joint profits are smaller than
the monopoly profits. See above.
3. prefers LS to LF to SP if
πc < f < 12λ + π
c(1− 12α) and λ > απc or
• from Finding 4.4 and πc < f it directly follows that there is no entry
under LS
• from Finding 4.6, πc < f < 12λ + πc(1 − 12α) and λ > απc it directly
follows that there is a settlement under SP
• from Finding 4.5 πc < f < 12λ + πc(1 − 12α) and λ > απc it directly
follows that there is a settlement under LF
The patentholder has the highest profits πm under LS. Under LF he has
higher profits than under SP because in the bargaining the firms have the
same outside options but the joint profit πm − πc is higher under LF than
under SP Πs − πc.
4. prefers LF to SP and SP to LS if
f < πc and λ > αf
From Findings 4.4-4.6 it directly follows that under LS there is a lawsuit and
under SP and LF there is a settlement.
SP and LF is better because the patentholder gets in the bargaining the outside
option plus a part of the bargaining surplus. This is higher than under LS
where he gets the payoff from a lawsuit which is equal to the outside option.
LF yields higher profits for the patentholder than the SP because under both
policies the outside option is the same but the bargaining surplus is higher
under LF.
5. prefers LF to SP and LS and is indifferent between SP and LS if f < πc and
λ < αf < (1− α)(πm − 2πc)
• from Finding 4.4, f < πc it directly follows that there will be a lawsuit
under LS
• from Finding 4.6, f < πc and λ < αf it directly follows that there will
be a lawsuit under SP
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• from Finding 4.5, f < πc and αf < (1 − α)(πm − 2πc) it follows that
there is a settlement under LF
Profits under LS and SP are therefore απm+(1−α)πc. This less than under LF
because the profits under LS and SP are the outside option in the bargaining
under LF.
Proof of Proposition 4.4
Welfare with laissez-faire policy :
W
LF
=
8>>><>>>:
CSm + πm − f if f < πc ∧ πm − 2πc ≥ 11−α f
α(CSm + πm) + (1− α)(CSc + 2πc − f) if f < πc ∧ πm − 2πc < 11−α f
CSm + πm if πc ≤ f < 12 [(1− α)πm + απc)] ∧ 1− απm < πc
CSm + πm − f if πc ≤ f < 12 [(1− α)πm + απc)] ∧ 1− απm ≥ πc
CSm + πm if 12 [(1− α)πm + απc] ≤ f
Welfare with lump-sum policy :
WLS =
{
α(CSm + πm) + (1− α)(CSc + 2πc − f) if f < πc
CSm + πm if f ≥ πc
Welfare with Shapiro policy:
W
SP
=
8>>><>>>:
α(CSm + πm) + (1− α)(CSc + 2πc − f) if f < πc ∧ λ < αf
α(CSm + πm) + (1− α)(CSc + 2πc) + λ− f if f < πc ∧ λ ≥ αf
CSm + πm if πc ≤ f < πc(1− 12 α) + 12 λ ∧ λ < απc
α(CSm + πm) + (1− α)(CSc + 2πc) + λ− f if πc ≤ f < πc(1− 12 α) + 12 λ ∧ λ ≥ απc
CSm + πm if πc(1− 12 α) + 12 λ ≤ f
1. By comparison one sees that WLF ≤ WSP ∧WLF ≤ WLS∀f .
2. With f < πc market entry occurs with lump-sum policy and yields
WLS = α(CSm + πm) + (1− α)(CSc + 2πc − f).
With f < πc the Shapiro policy leads to
WSP =
{
α(CSm + πm) + (1− α)(CSc + 2πc − f) if f < πc ∧ λ < αf
α(CSm + πm) + (1− α)(CSc + 2πc) + λ− f if f < πc ∧ λ ≥ αf
To show:
α(CSm +πm)+(1−α)(CSc +2πc−f) ≤ α(CSm +πm)+(1−α)(CSc +2πc)+λ−f
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−(1− α)f ≤ λ− f
This true with λ ≥ αf .
2. With f ≥ πc no market entry occurs under lump-sum policy, thus
WLS = CSm + πm.
With f ≥ πc the Shapiro policy yields
W
SP
=
(
CSm + πm if πc ≤ f < πc(1− 12 α) + 12 λ ∧ λ < απc
α(CSm + πm) + (1− α)(CSc + 2πc) + λ− f if πc ≤ f < πc(1− 12 α) + 12 λ ∧ λ ≥ απc
To show:
α(CSm + πm) + (1− α)(CSc + 2πc) + λ− f Q CSm + πm
See Part 2 of the proof of Proposition 4.2.
Proof of Finding 4.7
1. There is a lawsuit if f ≤ πc ∧ f < α1−α(πm − 2πc).
We know the critical value s.t. the bargaining surplus is positive: f ≥
α
1−α(π
m − 2πc). Furthermore, suing and entering makes only sense if f ≤ πc.
2. There is neither a lawsuit nor a settlement if
a) πc < f ≤ 2πc + α(πc − πm) ∧ πc < α1−α(πm − 2πc), or
b) f > 2πc + α(πc − πm).
Calculation of the value of f where the entrant gets a settlement with a positive
payoff. By w we denote the fixed costs he sinks to get a settlement
πE =
1
2
[2πc − (απm + (1− α)πc) + (1− α)(πc − (f − w))]− w
∂πE
∂w
=
1
2
(1− α)− 1 < 0
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Thus, the optimal w would be w = f − πc.
Anticipating this, the entrant’s profit from a settlement with f > πc is
πsE =
1
2
[2πc − (απm + (1− α)πc)]− 1
2
w
πsE =
1
2
[πc − απm + απc]− 1
2
w
This leads to the critical value of f :
f = w + πc = 2πc + α(πc − πm)
Combined with f − w = πc ≥ α1−α(πm − 2πc) this ensures a settlement and
proves Part 2.
Part 3:
3. There is a settlement if
a) f < πc ∧ f ≥ α1−α(πm − 2πc), or
b) πc ≤ f ≤ 2πc + α(πc − πm) ∧ πc ≥ f
This directly follows from Part 2.
Proof of Finding 4.8
1. Firstly, we derive the optimal w = f − πc for f > πc
πE =
1
2
[πm − (απm + (1− α)πc) + (1− α)(πc − (f − w))]− w
∂πE
∂w
=
1
2
(1− α)− 1 < 0
2. Secondly, incorporating w in the bargaining gives the critical value of f :
πSE =
1
2
(1− α)(πm − πc)− 1
2
w ≥ 0
(1− α)(πm − πc) + πc ≥ fmax
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Proof of Finding 4.9
Entrant’s payoff with f < πc:
πsE = (1−α)(πc−f)+
1
2
[απm +(1−α)2πc +λ− (απm +(1−α)πc)− (1−α)(πc−f)]
πsE =
1
2
[απm + (1− α)2πc + λ− (απm + (1− α)πc) + (1− α)(πc − f)]
πsE =
1
2
[(1− α)πc + λ + (1− α)(πc − f)] > 0
Entrant’s payoff with f = πc:
πsE =
1
2
[(1− α)πc + λ] > 0
Optimal w that the entrant should sink ex ante with f > πc:
πE =
1
2
[απm + (1− α)2πc + λ− (απm + (1− α)πc) + (1− α)(πc − (f − w)]− w
∂πE
∂w
=
1
2
(1− α)− w < 0
Hence, the optimal w is f − πc. The resulting payoff is:
πsE =
1
2
[(1− α)πc + λ]− 1
2
w ≥ 0
(1− α)πc + λ ≥ w
(1− α)πc + λ + πc ≥ w + πc = f
(2− α)πc + λ ≥ f
Proof of Proposition 4.5
Part 1a:
f < πc ∧ f < α1−α(πm − 2πc)
With LS → lawsuit: πP = απm + (1− α)πc.
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With SP → settlement: πSP = 12 [απm + (1−α)2πc + λ + απm + (1−α)πc− (1−
α)(πc − f)].
With LF → settlement:πSP = 12 [πm + απm + (1− α)πc − (1− α)(πc − f)].
⇒ LF>SP>LS.
f < πc ∧ f ≥ α1−α(πm − 2πc)
With LS → settlement: πP = 12 [2πc + απm + (1− α)πc − (1− α)(πc − f)].
With SP → settlement: πSP = 12 [απm + (1−α)2πc + λ + απm + (1−α)πc− (1−
α)(πc − f)].
With LF → settlement:πSP = 12 [πm + απm + (1− α)πc − (1− α)(πc − f)].
⇒ LF>SP>LS.
Part 1b:
πc ≤ f < 2πc + α(πc − πm) ∧ πc ≤ α1−α(πm − 2πc)
With LS → settlement: πP = 12 [2πc + απm + (1− α)πc − (1− α)(πc − f)].
With SP → settlement: πSP = 12 [απm + (1−α)2πc + λ + απm + (1−α)πc− (1−
α)(πc − f)].
With LF → settlement:πSP = 12 [πm + απm + (1− α)πc − (1− α)(πc − f)].
⇒ LF>SP>LS.
Part 2a:
πc ≤ f < 2πc + α(πc − πm) ∧ πc > α1−α(πm − 2πc)
With LS → no settlement/ lawsuit: πP = πm.
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With SP → settlement: πSP = 12 [απm + (1−α)2πc + λ + απm + (1−α)πc− (1−
α)(πc − f)].
With LF → settlement:πSP = 12 [πm + απm + (1− α)πc − (1− α)(πc − f)].
⇒ LS>LF>SP.
Part 2b:
2πc + α(πc − πm) ≤ f < λ + πc(2− α)
With LS → no settlement/lawsuit: πP = πm.
With SP → settlement: πSP = 12 [απm + (1−α)2πc + λ + απm + (1−α)πc− (1−
α)(πc − f)].
With LF → settlement:πSP = 12 [πm + απm + (1− α)πc − (1− α)(πc − f)].
⇒ LS>LF>SP.
Part 3:
λ + πc(2− α) < f < (1− α)(πm − πc) + πc
With LS → no settlement/lawsuit: πP = πm.
With SP → no settlement/lawsuit:πP = πm.
With LF → settlement:πSP = 12 [πm + απm + (1− α)πc − (1− α)(πc − f)].
⇒ LS=SP>LF.
Part 4:
(1− α)(πm − πc) + πc ≤ f
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With LS → no settlement/lawsuit: πP = πm.
With SP → no settlement/lawsuit:πP = πm.
With LF → no settlement/lawsuit:πP = πm.
⇒ LS=SP=LF.
Proof of Proposition 4.6
Welfare under LS:
WF LS =
8>>><>>>:
α(πm + CSm) + (1− α)(2πc + CSc − f) if f < πc ∧ f < α
1−α (π
m − 2πc)
2πc + CSc if f < πc ∧ f ≥ α
1−α (π
m − 2πc)
2πc + CSc if πc ≤ f < 2πc + α(πc − πm) ∧ πc ≥ α
1−α (π
m − 2πc)
πm + CSm if πc ≤ f < 2πc + α(πc − πm) ∧ πc < α
1−α (π
m − 2πc)
πm + CSm if f > 2πc + α(πc − πm)
Welfare under LF:
WFLF = πm + CSm
Welfare under SP:
WFSP =
{
α(πm + CSm) + (1− α)(2πc + CSc) + λ if f ≤ λ + πc(2− α)
πm + CSm if f > λ + πc(2− α)
Comparison:
1. WLF ≤ WFSP and WLF ≤ WLS∀f .
2.
If f < πc ∧ f ≥ α1−α(πm − 2πc) then WLS ≥ WSP .
If πc ≤ f < 2πc + α(πc − πm) ∧ πc ≥ α1−α(πm − 2πc) then WLS ≥ WSP .
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Otherwise WLS < WSP .
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